Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Elm and the Expert', 'Abstract Entities' and 'Analyzing Modality'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


48 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
A standard naturalist view is realist, externalist, and computationalist, and believes in rationality [Fodor]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Psychology has to include the idea that mental processes are typically truth-preserving [Fodor]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
Inferences are surely part of the causal structure of the world [Fodor]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
'All horses' either picks out the horses, or the things which are horses [Jubien]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
Some abstract things have a beginning and end, so may exist in time (though not space) [Swoyer]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
Ontologists seek existence and identity conditions, and modal and epistemic status for a thing [Swoyer]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Can properties exemplify other properties? [Swoyer]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Being a physical object is our most fundamental category [Jubien]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
Quantum field theory suggests that there are, fundamentally, no individual things [Swoyer]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
Haecceities implausibly have no qualities [Jubien]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences [Jubien]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual [Jubien]
Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities [Jubien]
Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities [Jubien]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be [Jubien]
If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world [Jubien]
If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary [Jubien]
If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily? [Jubien]
Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity [Jubien]
Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds [Jubien]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person [Jubien]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 5. Controlling Beliefs
Control of belief is possible if you know truth conditions and what causes beliefs [Fodor]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
An experiment is a deliberate version of what informal thinking does all the time [Fodor]
Participation in an experiment requires agreement about what the outcome will mean [Fodor]
We can deliberately cause ourselves to have true thoughts - hence the value of experiments [Fodor]
Interrogation and experiment submit us to having beliefs caused [Fodor]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Theories are links in the causal chain between the environment and our beliefs [Fodor]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind
I say psychology is intentional, semantics is informational, and thinking is computation [Fodor]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
We are probably the only creatures that can think about our own thoughts [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
Semantics v syntax is the interaction problem all over again [Fodor]
Cartesians consider interaction to be a miracle [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Type physicalism equates mental kinds with physical kinds [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
Hume has no theory of the co-ordination of the mind [Fodor]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes
Propositional attitudes are propositions presented in a certain way [Fodor]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Rationality has mental properties - autonomy, productivity, experiment [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
XYZ (Twin Earth 'water') is an impossibility [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Truth conditions require a broad concept of content [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
Concepts aren't linked to stuff; they are what is caused by stuff [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
Knowing the cause of a thought is almost knowing its content [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 12. Informational Semantics
Is content basically information, fixed externally? [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
In the information view, concepts are potentials for making distinctions [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Semantic externalism says the concept 'elm' needs no further beliefs or inferences [Fodor]
If meaning is information, that establishes the causal link between the state of the world and our beliefs [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
To know the content of a thought is to know what would make it true [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
For holists no two thoughts are ever quite the same, which destroys faith in meaning [Fodor]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
It is claimed that reference doesn't fix sense (Jocasta), and sense doesn't fix reference (Twin Earth) [Fodor]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
Broad semantics holds that the basic semantic properties are truth and denotation [Fodor]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
Externalist semantics are necessary to connect the contents of beliefs with how the world is [Fodor]