25 ideas
| 12619 | We have no successful definitions, because they all use indefinable words [Fodor] |
| 15557 | Verisimilitude has proved hard to analyse, and seems to have several components [Lewis] |
| 4298 | All items of possible human knowledge are interconnected, and can be reached by inference [Descartes] |
| 12620 | If 'exist' is ambiguous in 'chairs and numbers exist', that mirrors the difference between chairs and numbers [Fodor] |
| 15554 | A disposition needs a causal basis, a property in a certain causal role. Could the disposition be the property? [Lewis] |
| 12613 | Empiricists use dispositions reductively, as 'possibility of sensation' or 'possibility of experimental result' [Fodor] |
| 15560 | We can explain a chance event, but can never show why some other outcome did not occur [Lewis] |
| 12617 | Associationism can't explain how truth is preserved [Fodor] |
| 15559 | Does a good explanation produce understanding? That claim is just empty [Lewis] |
| 15556 | Science may well pursue generalised explanation, rather than laws [Lewis] |
| 15558 | A good explanation is supposed to show that the event had to happen [Lewis] |
| 4809 | Lewis endorses the thesis that all explanation of singular events is causal explanation [Lewis, by Psillos] |
| 14321 | To explain an event is to provide some information about its causal history [Lewis] |
| 12615 | Mental representations are the old 'Ideas', but without images [Fodor] |
| 6650 | Fodor is now less keen on the innateness of concepts [Fodor, by Lowe] |
| 12618 | It is essential to the concept CAT that it be satisfied by cats [Fodor] |
| 12614 | I prefer psychological atomism - that concepts are independent of epistemic capacities [Fodor] |
| 12621 | Definable concepts have constituents, which are necessary, individuate them, and demonstrate possession [Fodor] |
| 12622 | Many concepts lack prototypes, and complex prototypes aren't built from simple ones [Fodor] |
| 12623 | The theory theory can't actually tell us what concepts are [Fodor] |
| 12616 | English has no semantic theory, just associations between sentences and thoughts [Fodor] |
| 15555 | Explaining match lighting in general is like explaining one lighting of a match [Lewis] |
| 15552 | We only pick 'the' cause for the purposes of some particular enquiry. [Lewis] |
| 15551 | Ways of carving causes may be natural, but never 'right' [Lewis] |
| 15553 | Causal dependence is counterfactual dependence between events [Lewis] |