47 ideas
2463 | A standard naturalist view is realist, externalist, and computationalist, and believes in rationality [Fodor] |
2435 | Psychology has to include the idea that mental processes are typically truth-preserving [Fodor] |
2442 | Inferences are surely part of the causal structure of the world [Fodor] |
19724 | Belief is knowledge if it is true, certain, and obtained by a reliable process [Ramsey] |
2462 | Control of belief is possible if you know truth conditions and what causes beliefs [Fodor] |
2454 | We can deliberately cause ourselves to have true thoughts - hence the value of experiments [Fodor] |
2455 | Interrogation and experiment submit us to having beliefs caused [Fodor] |
2460 | Participation in an experiment requires agreement about what the outcome will mean [Fodor] |
2461 | An experiment is a deliberate version of what informal thinking does all the time [Fodor] |
2458 | Theories are links in the causal chain between the environment and our beliefs [Fodor] |
2443 | I say psychology is intentional, semantics is informational, and thinking is computation [Fodor] |
2453 | We are probably the only creatures that can think about our own thoughts [Fodor] |
3847 | Man is nothing else but the sum of his actions [Sartre] |
3846 | Man IS freedom [Sartre] |
2446 | Cartesians consider interaction to be a miracle [Fodor] |
2445 | Semantics v syntax is the interaction problem all over again [Fodor] |
2464 | Type physicalism equates mental kinds with physical kinds [Fodor] |
2447 | Hume has no theory of the co-ordination of the mind [Fodor] |
2440 | Propositional attitudes are propositions presented in a certain way [Fodor] |
2450 | Rationality has mental properties - autonomy, productivity, experiment [Fodor] |
2437 | XYZ (Twin Earth 'water') is an impossibility [Fodor] |
2441 | Truth conditions require a broad concept of content [Fodor] |
3114 | Concepts aren't linked to stuff; they are what is caused by stuff [Fodor] |
2452 | Knowing the cause of a thought is almost knowing its content [Fodor] |
2432 | Is content basically information, fixed externally? [Fodor] |
2438 | In the information view, concepts are potentials for making distinctions [Fodor] |
2439 | Semantic externalism says the concept 'elm' needs no further beliefs or inferences [Fodor] |
2457 | If meaning is information, that establishes the causal link between the state of the world and our beliefs [Fodor] |
2451 | To know the content of a thought is to know what would make it true [Fodor] |
2433 | For holists no two thoughts are ever quite the same, which destroys faith in meaning [Fodor] |
2436 | It is claimed that reference doesn't fix sense (Jocasta), and sense doesn't fix reference (Twin Earth) [Fodor] |
2434 | Broad semantics holds that the basic semantic properties are truth and denotation [Fodor] |
2459 | Externalist semantics are necessary to connect the contents of beliefs with how the world is [Fodor] |
3843 | There is no human nature [Sartre] |
20762 | There are no values to justify us, and no excuses [Sartre] |
3852 | If values depend on us, freedom is the foundation of all values [Sartre] |
20764 | In becoming what we want to be we create what we think man ought to be [Sartre] |
3848 | Cowards are responsible for their cowardice [Sartre] |
20763 | When my personal freedom becomes involved, I must want freedom for everyone else [Sartre] |
22229 | Existentialists says that cowards and heroes make themselves [Sartre] |
3842 | Existence before essence (or begin with the subjective) [Sartre] |
6868 | 'Existence precedes essence' means we have no pre-existing self, but create it through existence [Sartre, by Le Poidevin] |
3844 | Existentialism says man is whatever he makes of himself [Sartre] |
20754 | It is dishonest to offer passions as an excuse [Sartre] |
6571 | When a man must choose between his mother and the Resistance, no theory can help [Sartre, by Fogelin] |
3851 | If I do not choose, that is still a choice [Sartre] |
3845 | Without God there is no intelligibility or value [Sartre] |