Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Concepts:where cogn.science went wrong', 'The Analyst' and 'On the Infinite'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

23 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
12619 We have no successful definitions, because they all use indefinable words [Fodor]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
12456 I aim to establish certainty for mathematical methods [Hilbert]
12461 We believe all mathematical problems are solvable [Hilbert]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
9633 No one shall drive us out of the paradise the Cantor has created for us [Hilbert]
12460 We extend finite statements with ideal ones, in order to preserve our logic [Hilbert]
12462 Only the finite can bring certainty to the infinite [Hilbert]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / d. Actual infinite
12455 The idea of an infinite totality is an illusion [Hilbert]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / j. Infinite divisibility
12457 There is no continuum in reality to realise the infinitely small [Hilbert]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / k. Infinitesimals
18091 Infinitesimals are ghosts of departed quantities [Berkeley]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
12459 The subject matter of mathematics is immediate and clear concrete symbols [Hilbert]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 8. Finitism
18112 Mathematics divides in two: meaningful finitary statements, and empty idealised statements [Hilbert]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
12620 If 'exist' is ambiguous in 'chairs and numbers exist', that mirrors the difference between chairs and numbers [Fodor]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
12613 Empiricists use dispositions reductively, as 'possibility of sensation' or 'possibility of experimental result' [Fodor]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
9636 My theory aims at the certitude of mathematical methods [Hilbert]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
12617 Associationism can't explain how truth is preserved [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
12615 Mental representations are the old 'Ideas', but without images [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
6650 Fodor is now less keen on the innateness of concepts [Fodor, by Lowe]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / a. Concepts as representations
12618 It is essential to the concept CAT that it be satisfied by cats [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
12614 I prefer psychological atomism - that concepts are independent of epistemic capacities [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
12621 Definable concepts have constituents, which are necessary, individuate them, and demonstrate possession [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / d. Concepts as prototypes
12622 Many concepts lack prototypes, and complex prototypes aren't built from simple ones [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
12623 The theory theory can't actually tell us what concepts are [Fodor]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
12616 English has no semantic theory, just associations between sentences and thoughts [Fodor]