47 ideas
| 1642 | We must fight fiercely for knowledge, understanding and intelligence [Plato] |
| 1645 | The desire to split everything into its parts is unpleasant and unphilosophical [Plato] |
| 2463 | A standard naturalist view is realist, externalist, and computationalist, and believes in rationality [Fodor] |
| 1644 | Dialectic should only be taught to those who already philosophise well [Plato] |
| 287 | Good analysis involves dividing things into appropriate forms without confusion [Plato] |
| 20478 | In discussion a person's opinions are shown to be in conflict, leading to calm self-criticism [Plato] |
| 2435 | Psychology has to include the idea that mental processes are typically truth-preserving [Fodor] |
| 2442 | Inferences are surely part of the causal structure of the world [Fodor] |
| 13832 | Natural deduction shows the heart of reasoning (and sequent calculus is just a tool) [Gentzen, by Hacking] |
| 11278 | What does 'that which is not' refer to? [Plato] |
| 1643 | If statements about non-existence are logically puzzling, so are statements about existence [Plato] |
| 7022 | To be is to have a capacity, to act on other things, or to receive actions [Plato] |
| 1641 | Some alarming thinkers think that only things which you can touch exist [Plato] |
| 10784 | Whenever there's speech it has to be about something [Plato] |
| 16122 | Good thinkers spot forms spread through things, or included within some larger form [Plato] |
| 10422 | The not-beautiful is part of the beautiful, though opposed to it, and is just as real [Plato] |
| 15855 | If we see everything as separate, we can then give no account of it [Plato] |
| 1637 | A soul without understanding is ugly [Plato] |
| 2462 | Control of belief is possible if you know truth conditions and what causes beliefs [Fodor] |
| 2461 | An experiment is a deliberate version of what informal thinking does all the time [Fodor] |
| 2460 | Participation in an experiment requires agreement about what the outcome will mean [Fodor] |
| 2454 | We can deliberately cause ourselves to have true thoughts - hence the value of experiments [Fodor] |
| 2455 | Interrogation and experiment submit us to having beliefs caused [Fodor] |
| 2458 | Theories are links in the causal chain between the environment and our beliefs [Fodor] |
| 2443 | I say psychology is intentional, semantics is informational, and thinking is computation [Fodor] |
| 2453 | We are probably the only creatures that can think about our own thoughts [Fodor] |
| 2445 | Semantics v syntax is the interaction problem all over again [Fodor] |
| 2446 | Cartesians consider interaction to be a miracle [Fodor] |
| 2464 | Type physicalism equates mental kinds with physical kinds [Fodor] |
| 2447 | Hume has no theory of the co-ordination of the mind [Fodor] |
| 2440 | Propositional attitudes are propositions presented in a certain way [Fodor] |
| 2450 | Rationality has mental properties - autonomy, productivity, experiment [Fodor] |
| 2437 | XYZ (Twin Earth 'water') is an impossibility [Fodor] |
| 2441 | Truth conditions require a broad concept of content [Fodor] |
| 3114 | Concepts aren't linked to stuff; they are what is caused by stuff [Fodor] |
| 2452 | Knowing the cause of a thought is almost knowing its content [Fodor] |
| 2432 | Is content basically information, fixed externally? [Fodor] |
| 2438 | In the information view, concepts are potentials for making distinctions [Fodor] |
| 2439 | Semantic externalism says the concept 'elm' needs no further beliefs or inferences [Fodor] |
| 2457 | If meaning is information, that establishes the causal link between the state of the world and our beliefs [Fodor] |
| 2451 | To know the content of a thought is to know what would make it true [Fodor] |
| 2433 | For holists no two thoughts are ever quite the same, which destroys faith in meaning [Fodor] |
| 2436 | It is claimed that reference doesn't fix sense (Jocasta), and sense doesn't fix reference (Twin Earth) [Fodor] |
| 2434 | Broad semantics holds that the basic semantic properties are truth and denotation [Fodor] |
| 2459 | Externalist semantics are necessary to connect the contents of beliefs with how the world is [Fodor] |
| 1636 | Wickedness is an illness of the soul [Plato] |
| 1638 | Didactic education is hard work and achieves little [Plato] |