Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Jerry A. Fodor on himself', 'Letters to Des Bosses' and 'Commentary on Euclid's 'Elements''

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22 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
12780 We can grasp the wisdom of God a priori [Leibniz]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
12774 Without a substantial chain to link monads, they would just be coordinated dreams [Leibniz]
12782 Monads control nothing outside of themselves [Leibniz]
12777 Monads do not make a unity unless a substantial chain is added to them [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
12778 There is active and passive power in the substantial chain and in the essence of a composite [Leibniz]
12783 Primitive force is what gives a composite its reality [Leibniz]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
12775 Things seem to be unified if we see duration, position, interaction and connection [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
12776 Every substance is alive [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
12753 A substantial bond of powers is needed to unite composites, in addition to monads [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 12. Essential Parts
12781 A composite substance is a mere aggregate if its essence is just its parts [Leibniz]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
12779 There is a reason why not every possible thing exists [Leibniz]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
3978 Associations are held to connect Ideas together in the way the world is connected together [Fodor]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 2. Knowledge as Convention
12785 Truth is mutually agreed perception [Leibniz]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
13165 Geometrical proofs do not show causes, as when we prove a triangle contains two right angles [Proclus]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
3976 Intentional science needs objects with semantic and causal properties, and which obey laws [Fodor]
3980 Intentional states and processes may be causal relations among mental symbols [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
3981 Most psychological properties seem to be multiply realisable [Fodor]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
3975 Folk psychology explains behaviour by reference to intentional states like belief and desire [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
3982 How could the extrinsic properties of thoughts supervene on their intrinsic properties? [Fodor]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
9569 The origin of geometry started in sensation, then moved to calculation, and then to reason [Proclus]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
3977 Laws are true generalisations which support counterfactuals and are confirmed by instances [Fodor]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / e. Miracles
12784 Allow no more miracles than are necessary [Leibniz]