51 ideas
| 24032 | Clever scholars can obscure things which are obvious even to peasants [Descartes] |
| 24033 | Most scholastic disputes concern words, where agreeing on meanings would settle them [Descartes] |
| 24024 | The secret of the method is to recognise which thing in a series is the simplest [Descartes] |
| 24018 | One truth leads us to another [Descartes] |
| 2463 | A standard naturalist view is realist, externalist, and computationalist, and believes in rationality [Fodor] |
| 2435 | Psychology has to include the idea that mental processes are typically truth-preserving [Fodor] |
| 2442 | Inferences are surely part of the causal structure of the world [Fodor] |
| 24035 | Unity is something shared by many things, so in that respect they are equals [Descartes] |
| 24036 | I can only see the proportion of two to three if there is a common measure - their unity [Descartes] |
| 24029 | Among the simples are the graspable negations, such as rest and instants [Descartes] |
| 12733 | Because of the definitions of cause, effect and power, cause and effect have the same power [Leibniz] |
| 12734 | Every necessary proposition is demonstrable to someone who understands [Leibniz] |
| 24030 | 3+4=7 is necessary because we cannot conceive of seven without including three and four [Descartes] |
| 24019 | If we accept mere probabilities as true we undermine our existing knowledge [Descartes] |
| 24020 | We all see intuitively that we exist, where intuition is attentive, clear and distinct rational understanding [Descartes] |
| 24031 | When Socrates doubts, he know he doubts, and that truth is possible [Descartes] |
| 24025 | Clear and distinct truths must be known all at once (unlike deductions) [Descartes] |
| 24022 | Our souls possess divine seeds of knowledge, which can bear spontaneous fruit [Descartes] |
| 24034 | If someone had only seen the basic colours, they could deduce the others from resemblance [Descartes] |
| 24021 | The method starts with clear intuitions, followed by a process of deduction [Descartes] |
| 2462 | Control of belief is possible if you know truth conditions and what causes beliefs [Fodor] |
| 2460 | Participation in an experiment requires agreement about what the outcome will mean [Fodor] |
| 2454 | We can deliberately cause ourselves to have true thoughts - hence the value of experiments [Fodor] |
| 2455 | Interrogation and experiment submit us to having beliefs caused [Fodor] |
| 2461 | An experiment is a deliberate version of what informal thinking does all the time [Fodor] |
| 2458 | Theories are links in the causal chain between the environment and our beliefs [Fodor] |
| 2443 | I say psychology is intentional, semantics is informational, and thinking is computation [Fodor] |
| 24027 | Nerves and movement originate in the brain, where imagination moves them [Descartes] |
| 2453 | We are probably the only creatures that can think about our own thoughts [Fodor] |
| 24026 | Our four knowledge faculties are intelligence, imagination, the senses, and memory [Descartes] |
| 24028 | The force by which we know things is spiritual, and quite distinct from the body [Descartes] |
| 2446 | Cartesians consider interaction to be a miracle [Fodor] |
| 2445 | Semantics v syntax is the interaction problem all over again [Fodor] |
| 2464 | Type physicalism equates mental kinds with physical kinds [Fodor] |
| 2447 | Hume has no theory of the co-ordination of the mind [Fodor] |
| 2440 | Propositional attitudes are propositions presented in a certain way [Fodor] |
| 2450 | Rationality has mental properties - autonomy, productivity, experiment [Fodor] |
| 2437 | XYZ (Twin Earth 'water') is an impossibility [Fodor] |
| 2441 | Truth conditions require a broad concept of content [Fodor] |
| 3114 | Concepts aren't linked to stuff; they are what is caused by stuff [Fodor] |
| 2452 | Knowing the cause of a thought is almost knowing its content [Fodor] |
| 2432 | Is content basically information, fixed externally? [Fodor] |
| 2438 | In the information view, concepts are potentials for making distinctions [Fodor] |
| 2439 | Semantic externalism says the concept 'elm' needs no further beliefs or inferences [Fodor] |
| 2457 | If meaning is information, that establishes the causal link between the state of the world and our beliefs [Fodor] |
| 2451 | To know the content of a thought is to know what would make it true [Fodor] |
| 2433 | For holists no two thoughts are ever quite the same, which destroys faith in meaning [Fodor] |
| 2436 | It is claimed that reference doesn't fix sense (Jocasta), and sense doesn't fix reference (Twin Earth) [Fodor] |
| 2434 | Broad semantics holds that the basic semantic properties are truth and denotation [Fodor] |
| 2459 | Externalist semantics are necessary to connect the contents of beliefs with how the world is [Fodor] |
| 24023 | All the sciences searching for order and measure are related to mathematics [Descartes] |