Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Concepts:where cogn.science went wrong', 'What is Analytic Philosophy?' and 'Morality and the emotions'

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
Analysis must include definitions, search for simples, concept analysis, and Kant's analysis [Glock]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
We have no successful definitions, because they all use indefinable words [Fodor]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
If 'exist' is ambiguous in 'chairs and numbers exist', that mirrors the difference between chairs and numbers [Fodor]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
Empiricists use dispositions reductively, as 'possibility of sensation' or 'possibility of experimental result' [Fodor]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
German and British idealism is not about individual ideas, but the intelligibility of reality [Glock]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
Associationism can't explain how truth is preserved [Fodor]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
Reference to a person's emotions is often essential to understanding their actions [Williams,B]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / g. Controlling emotions
Moral education must involve learning about various types of feeling towards things [Williams,B]
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
Mental representations are the old 'Ideas', but without images [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
Fodor is now less keen on the innateness of concepts [Fodor, by Lowe]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / a. Concepts as representations
It is essential to the concept CAT that it be satisfied by cats [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
I prefer psychological atomism - that concepts are independent of epistemic capacities [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
Definable concepts have constituents, which are necessary, individuate them, and demonstrate possession [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / d. Concepts as prototypes
Many concepts lack prototypes, and complex prototypes aren't built from simple ones [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
The theory theory can't actually tell us what concepts are [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / h. Family resemblance
The variety of uses of 'game' may be that it has several meanings, and isn't a single concept [Glock]
We might say that the family resemblance is just a consequence of meaning-as-use [Glock]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
English has no semantic theory, just associations between sentences and thoughts [Fodor]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Emotivism saw morality as expressing emotions, and influencing others' emotions [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
An admirable human being should have certain kinds of emotional responses [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
Kant's love of consistency is too rigid, and it even overrides normal fairness [Williams,B]