Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Elm and the Expert', 'Critique of Judgement I: Aesthetic' and 'Letters from a Stoic'

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77 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom does not lie in books, and unread people can also become wise [Seneca]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Wise people escape necessity by willing it [Seneca]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophy aims at happiness [Seneca]
What philosophy offers humanity is guidance [Seneca]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 3. Analysis of Preconditions
That something is a necessary condition of something else doesn't mean it caused it [Seneca]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Even philosophers have got bogged down in analysing tiny bits of language [Seneca]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
A standard naturalist view is realist, externalist, and computationalist, and believes in rationality [Fodor]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Psychology has to include the idea that mental processes are typically truth-preserving [Fodor]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
Inferences are surely part of the causal structure of the world [Fodor]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 5. Controlling Beliefs
Control of belief is possible if you know truth conditions and what causes beliefs [Fodor]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
Participation in an experiment requires agreement about what the outcome will mean [Fodor]
An experiment is a deliberate version of what informal thinking does all the time [Fodor]
We can deliberately cause ourselves to have true thoughts - hence the value of experiments [Fodor]
Interrogation and experiment submit us to having beliefs caused [Fodor]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Theories are links in the causal chain between the environment and our beliefs [Fodor]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
To the four causes Plato adds a fifth, the idea which guided the event [Seneca]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind
I say psychology is intentional, semantics is informational, and thinking is computation [Fodor]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
We are probably the only creatures that can think about our own thoughts [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
If everything can be measured, try measuring the size of a man's soul [Seneca]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
Cartesians consider interaction to be a miracle [Fodor]
Semantics v syntax is the interaction problem all over again [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Type physicalism equates mental kinds with physical kinds [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
Hume has no theory of the co-ordination of the mind [Fodor]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes
Propositional attitudes are propositions presented in a certain way [Fodor]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Rationality has mental properties - autonomy, productivity, experiment [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
XYZ (Twin Earth 'water') is an impossibility [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Truth conditions require a broad concept of content [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
Concepts aren't linked to stuff; they are what is caused by stuff [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
Knowing the cause of a thought is almost knowing its content [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 12. Informational Semantics
Is content basically information, fixed externally? [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
In the information view, concepts are potentials for making distinctions [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Semantic externalism says the concept 'elm' needs no further beliefs or inferences [Fodor]
If meaning is information, that establishes the causal link between the state of the world and our beliefs [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
To know the content of a thought is to know what would make it true [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
For holists no two thoughts are ever quite the same, which destroys faith in meaning [Fodor]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Referring to a person, and speaking about him, are very different [Seneca]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
It is claimed that reference doesn't fix sense (Jocasta), and sense doesn't fix reference (Twin Earth) [Fodor]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
Broad semantics holds that the basic semantic properties are truth and denotation [Fodor]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
Externalist semantics are necessary to connect the contents of beliefs with how the world is [Fodor]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 1. Aesthetics
Kant gave form and status to aesthetics, and Hegel gave it content [Kant, by Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 2. Aesthetic Attitude
The aesthetic attitude is a matter of disinterestedness [Kant, by Wollheim]
Only rational beings can experience beauty [Kant, by Scruton]
It is hard to see why we would have developed Kant's 'disinterested' aesthetic attitude [Cochrane on Kant]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 3. Taste
With respect to the senses, taste is an entirely personal matter [Kant]
When we judge beauty, it isn't just personal; we judge on behalf of everybody [Kant]
Saying everyone has their own taste destroys the very idea of taste [Kant]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
Kant thinks beauty ignores its objects, because it is only 'form' engaging with mind [Cochrane on Kant]
The beautiful is not conceptualised as moral, but it symbolises or resembles goodness [Kant, by Murdoch]
Kant saw beauty as a sort of disinterested pleasure, which has become separate from the good [Kant, by Taylor,C]
Beauty is only judged in pure contemplation, and not with something else at stake [Kant]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 6. The Sublime
The mathematical sublime is immeasurable greatness; the dynamical sublime is overpowering [Kant, by Pinkard]
The sublime is a moral experience [Kant, by Gardner]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 5. Objectivism in Art
Aesthetic values are not objectively valid, but we must treat them as if they are [Kant, by Scruton]
The judgement of beauty is not cognitive, but relates, via imagination, to pleasurable feelings [Kant]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Trouble in life comes from copying other people, which is following convention instead of reason [Seneca]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / d. Health
Humans acquired the concept of virtue from an analogy with bodily health and strength [Seneca, by Allen]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
We know death, which is like before birth; ceasing to be and never beginning are the same [Seneca]
Living is nothing wonderful; what matters is to die well [Seneca]
It is as silly to lament ceasing to be as to lament not having lived in the remote past [Seneca]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Is anything sweeter than valuing yourself more when you find you are loved? [Seneca]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
Selfishness does not produce happiness; to live for yourself, live for others [Seneca]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
A man is as unhappy as he has convinced himself he is [Seneca]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
Life is like a play - it is the quality that matters, not the length [Seneca]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
We are scared of death - except when we are immersed in pleasure! [Seneca]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / f. Dangers of pleasure
The whole point of pleasure-seeking is novelty, and abandoning established ways [Seneca]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / b. Living naturally
Nature doesn't give us virtue; we must unremittingly pursue it, as a training and an art [Seneca]
Living contrary to nature is like rowing against the stream [Seneca]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
Character is ruined by not looking back over our pasts, since the future rests on the past [Seneca]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / b. Temperance
It's no good winning lots of fights, if you are then conquered by your own temper [Seneca]
Excessive curiosity is a form of intemperance [Seneca]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
To govern used to mean to serve, not to rule; rulers did not test their powers over those who bestowed it [Seneca]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
One joy of learning is making teaching possible [Seneca]
Both teachers and pupils should aim at one thing - the improvement of the pupil [Seneca]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
Suicide may be appropriate even when it is not urgent, if there are few reasons against it [Seneca]
If we control our own death, no one has power over us [Seneca]
Sometimes we have a duty not to commit suicide, for those we love [Seneca]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / a. Absolute time
Does time exist on its own? Did anything precede it? Did it pre-exist the cosmos? [Seneca]