Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Elm and the Expert', 'The Sovereignty of Good' and 'There is no a Priori'

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48 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
An unexamined life can be virtuous [Murdoch]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / d. Philosophy as puzzles
Philosophy must keep returning to the beginning [Murdoch]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Philosophy moves continually between elaborate theories and the obvious facts [Murdoch]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
A standard naturalist view is realist, externalist, and computationalist, and believes in rationality [Fodor]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Psychology has to include the idea that mental processes are typically truth-preserving [Fodor]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
Inferences are surely part of the causal structure of the world [Fodor]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
Why should necessities only be knowable a priori? That Hesperus is Phosporus is known empirically [Devitt]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
We explain away a priori knowledge, not as directly empirical, but as indirectly holistically empirical [Devitt]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
The idea of the a priori is so obscure that it won't explain anything [Devitt]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 5. Controlling Beliefs
Control of belief is possible if you know truth conditions and what causes beliefs [Fodor]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
An experiment is a deliberate version of what informal thinking does all the time [Fodor]
Participation in an experiment requires agreement about what the outcome will mean [Fodor]
We can deliberately cause ourselves to have true thoughts - hence the value of experiments [Fodor]
Interrogation and experiment submit us to having beliefs caused [Fodor]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Theories are links in the causal chain between the environment and our beliefs [Fodor]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind
I say psychology is intentional, semantics is informational, and thinking is computation [Fodor]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
We are probably the only creatures that can think about our own thoughts [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
Semantics v syntax is the interaction problem all over again [Fodor]
Cartesians consider interaction to be a miracle [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Type physicalism equates mental kinds with physical kinds [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
Hume has no theory of the co-ordination of the mind [Fodor]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes
Propositional attitudes are propositions presented in a certain way [Fodor]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Rationality has mental properties - autonomy, productivity, experiment [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
XYZ (Twin Earth 'water') is an impossibility [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Truth conditions require a broad concept of content [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
Concepts aren't linked to stuff; they are what is caused by stuff [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
Knowing the cause of a thought is almost knowing its content [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 12. Informational Semantics
Is content basically information, fixed externally? [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
In the information view, concepts are potentials for making distinctions [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Semantic externalism says the concept 'elm' needs no further beliefs or inferences [Fodor]
If meaning is information, that establishes the causal link between the state of the world and our beliefs [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
To know the content of a thought is to know what would make it true [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
For holists no two thoughts are ever quite the same, which destroys faith in meaning [Fodor]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
It is claimed that reference doesn't fix sense (Jocasta), and sense doesn't fix reference (Twin Earth) [Fodor]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
Broad semantics holds that the basic semantic properties are truth and denotation [Fodor]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
Externalist semantics are necessary to connect the contents of beliefs with how the world is [Fodor]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / b. Literature
Literature is the most important aspect of culture, because it teaches understanding of living [Murdoch]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Appreciating beauty in art or nature opens up the good life, by restricting selfishness [Murdoch]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Ordinary human love is good evidence of transcendent goodness [Murdoch]
Love is a central concept in morals [Murdoch]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
If I attend properly I will have no choices [Murdoch]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
Art trains us in the love of virtue [Murdoch]
It is hard to learn goodness from others, because their virtues are part of their personal history [Murdoch]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
Moral reflection and experience gradually reveals unity in the moral world [Murdoch]
Only trivial virtues can be possessed on their own [Murdoch]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
Only a philosopher might think choices create values [Murdoch]
Kantian existentialists care greatly for reasons for action, whereas Surrealists care nothing [Murdoch]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
Moral philosophy needs a central concept with all the traditional attributes of God [Murdoch]