76 ideas
16606 | Original philosophers invariably seek inspiration from past thinkers [Pasnau] |
16604 | Philosophy consists of choosing between Plato, Aristotle and Democritus [Pasnau] |
16586 | The commentaries of Averroes were the leading guide to Aristotle [Pasnau] |
16568 | Modernity begins in the late 12th century, with Averroes's commentaries on Aristotle [Pasnau] |
16653 | Once accidents were seen as real, 'Categories' became the major text for ontology [Pasnau] |
16704 | In 1347, the Church effectively stopped philosophy for the next 300 years [Pasnau] |
16607 | Renaissance Platonism is peripheral [Pasnau] |
16715 | Plato only made an impact locally in 15th century Italy [Pasnau] |
16605 | After c.1450 all of Plato was available. Before that, only the first half of 'Timaeus' was known [Pasnau] |
16610 | Philosophy could easily have died in 17th century, if it weren't for Descartes [Pasnau] |
16781 | The 17th century is a metaphysical train wreck [Pasnau] |
16677 | Anti-Razor: if you can't account for a truth, keep positing things until you can [Pasnau] |
15592 | The usual Tarskian interpretation of variables is to specify their range of values [Fine,K] |
15593 | Variables can be viewed as special terms - functions taking assignments into individuals [Fine,K] |
15590 | It seemed that Frege gave the syntax for variables, and Tarski the semantics, and that was that [Fine,K] |
15591 | In separate expressions variables seem identical in role, but in the same expression they aren't [Fine,K] |
15595 | The 'algebraic' account of variables reduces quantification to the algebra of its component parts [Fine,K] |
15594 | 'Instantial' accounts of variables say we grasp arbitrary instances from their use in quantification [Fine,K] |
15599 | Cicero/Cicero and Cicero/Tully may differ in relationship, despite being semantically the same [Fine,K] |
16598 | Priority was a major topic of dispute for scholastics [Pasnau] |
16727 | In mixtures, the four elements ceased to exist, replaced by a mixed body with a form [Pasnau] |
16732 | 17th C qualities are either microphysical, or phenomenal, or powers [Pasnau] |
16733 | 17th century authors only recognised categorical properties, never dispositions [Pasnau] |
16662 | The biggest question for scholastics is whether properties are real, or modes of substances [Pasnau] |
16767 | There is no centralised power, but we still need essence for a metaphysical understanding [Pasnau] |
16788 | Instead of adding Aristotelian forms to physical stuff, one could add dispositions [Pasnau] |
16738 | Scholastics reject dispositions, because they are not actual, as forms require [Pasnau] |
16649 | Scholastics say there is a genuine thing if it is 'separable' [Pasnau] |
16785 | If you reject essences, questions of individuation become extremely difficult [Pasnau] |
16680 | Scholastics thought Quantity could be the principle of individuation [Pasnau] |
16617 | Corpuscularian critics of scholasticism say only substances exist [Pasnau] |
16628 | Corpuscularianism promised a decent account of substance [Pasnau] |
16741 | Scholastics wanted to treat Aristotelianism as physics, rather than as metaphysics [Pasnau] |
16777 | If crowds are things at all, they seem to be Substances, since they bear properties [Pasnau] |
16615 | Scholastics use 'substantia' for thick concrete entities, and for thin metaphysical ones [Pasnau] |
16775 | For corpuscularians, a substance is just its integral parts [Pasnau] |
16769 | If clay survives destruction of the statue, the statue wasn't a substance, but a mere accident [Pasnau] |
16602 | Corpuscularianism rejected not only form, but also the dependence of matter on form [Pasnau] |
16612 | Hylomorphism may not be a rival to science, but an abstract account of unity and endurance [Pasnau] |
16613 | Hylomorphism declined because scholastics made it into a testable physical theory [Pasnau] |
16747 | Scholastics made forms substantial, in a way unintended by Aristotle [Pasnau] |
16759 | Scholastics began to see substantial form more as Aristotle's 'efficient' cause [Pasnau] |
16748 | Aquinas says a substance has one form; Scotists say it has many forms [Pasnau] |
16671 | Scholastic Quantity either gives a body parts, or spreads them out in a unified way [Pasnau] |
16580 | A substrate may be 'prime matter', which endures through every change [Pasnau] |
16579 | There may be different types of substrate, or temporary substrates [Pasnau] |
16584 | If a substrate gives causal support for change, quite a lot of the ingredients must endure [Pasnau] |
16596 | A substratum can't be 'bare', because it has a job to do [Pasnau] |
16749 | Aristotelians deny that all necessary properties are essential [Pasnau] |
16694 | Typical successive things are time and motion [Pasnau] |
16583 | Weak ex nihilo says it all comes from something; strong version says the old must partly endure [Pasnau] |
15603 | I can only represent individuals as the same if I do not already represent them as the same [Fine,K] |
15604 | If Cicero=Tully refers to the man twice, then surely Cicero=Cicero does as well? [Fine,K] |
16783 | Essences must explain, so we can infer them causally from the accidents [Pasnau] |
15473 | How does anything get outside itself? [Fodor, by Martin,CB] |
2981 | Is intentionality outwardly folk psychology, inwardly mentalese? [Lyons on Fodor] |
2985 | Are beliefs brains states, but picked out at a "higher level"? [Lyons on Fodor] |
15602 | Mental files are devices for keeping track of basic coordination of objects [Fine,K] |
3135 | Is thought a syntactic computation using representations? [Fodor, by Rey] |
15588 | You cannot determine the full content from a thought's intrinsic character, as relations are involved [Fine,K] |
2983 | Maybe narrow content is physical, broad content less so [Lyons on Fodor] |
15596 | The standard aim of semantics is to assign a semantic value to each expression [Fine,K] |
15587 | That two utterances say the same thing may not be intrinsic to them, but involve their relationships [Fine,K] |
15589 | The two main theories are Holism (which is inferential), and Representational (which is atomistic) [Fine,K] |
15598 | We should pursue semantic facts as stated by truths in theories (and not put the theories first!) [Fine,K] |
15600 | Referentialist semantics has objects for names, properties for predicates, and propositions for connectives [Fine,K] |
15601 | Fregeans approach the world through sense, Referentialists through reference [Fine,K] |
15605 | I take indexicals such as 'this' and 'that' to be linked to some associated demonstration [Fine,K] |
16609 | Atomists say causation is mechanical collisions, and all true qualities are microscopic [Pasnau] |
16603 | In the 17th C matter became body, and was then studied by science [Pasnau] |
16592 | Atomism is the commonest version of corpuscularianism, but isn't required by it [Pasnau] |
16750 | If there are just arrangements of corpuscles, where are the boundaries between substances? [Pasnau] |
16722 | Scholastic causation is by changes in the primary qualities of hot, cold, wet, dry [Pasnau] |
16760 | Substantial forms were a step towards scientific essentialism [Pasnau] |
16581 | Scholastic authors agree that matter was created by God, out of nothing [Pasnau] |
16642 | Transubstantion says accidents of bread and wine don't inhere in the substance [Pasnau] |