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All the ideas for 'Concepts:where cogn.science went wrong', 'Naturalism in Mathematics' and 'Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic'

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45 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
We have no successful definitions, because they all use indefinable words [Fodor]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / b. Terminology of ST
'Forcing' can produce new models of ZFC from old models [Maddy]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
A Large Cardinal Axiom would assert ever-increasing stages in the hierarchy [Maddy]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / f. Axiom of Infinity V
Axiom of Infinity: completed infinite collections can be treated mathematically [Maddy]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / i. Axiom of Foundation VIII
The Axiom of Foundation says every set exists at a level in the set hierarchy [Maddy]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / p. Axiom of Reducibility
Axiom of Reducibility: propositional functions are extensionally predicative [Maddy]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
'Propositional functions' are propositions with a variable as subject or predicate [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / d. Actual infinite
Cantor and Dedekind brought completed infinities into mathematics [Maddy]
Completed infinities resulted from giving foundations to calculus [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / i. Cardinal infinity
For any cardinal there is always a larger one (so there is no set of all sets) [Maddy]
An 'inaccessible' cardinal cannot be reached by union sets or power sets [Maddy]
Infinity has degrees, and large cardinals are the heart of set theory [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / l. Limits
Theorems about limits could only be proved once the real numbers were understood [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
The extension of concepts is not important to me [Maddy]
In the ZFC hierarchy it is impossible to form Frege's set of all three-element sets [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / e. Caesar problem
Frege solves the Caesar problem by explicitly defining each number [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
Mathematics rests on the logic of proofs, and on the set theoretic axioms [Maddy]
Unified set theory gives a final court of appeal for mathematics [Maddy]
Set theory brings mathematics into one arena, where interrelations become clearer [Maddy]
Identifying geometric points with real numbers revealed the power of set theory [Maddy]
Making set theory foundational to mathematics leads to very fruitful axioms [Maddy]
The line of rationals has gaps, but set theory provided an ordered continuum [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics
Maybe applications of continuum mathematics are all idealisations [Maddy]
Scientists posit as few entities as possible, but set theorist posit as many as possible [Maddy]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
We can get arithmetic directly from HP; Law V was used to get HP from the definition of number [Maddy]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
If 'exist' is ambiguous in 'chairs and numbers exist', that mirrors the difference between chairs and numbers [Fodor]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
The theoretical indispensability of atoms did not at first convince scientists that they were real [Maddy]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
Empiricists use dispositions reductively, as 'possibility of sensation' or 'possibility of experimental result' [Fodor]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification [Lewis]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
Causal necessities hold in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke on Lewis]
Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do [Lewis]
If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart [Lewis]
Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts [Lewis]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
Associationism can't explain how truth is preserved [Fodor]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 6. Idealisation
Science idealises the earth's surface, the oceans, continuities, and liquids [Maddy]
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
Mental representations are the old 'Ideas', but without images [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
Fodor is now less keen on the innateness of concepts [Fodor, by Lowe]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / a. Concepts as representations
It is essential to the concept CAT that it be satisfied by cats [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
I prefer psychological atomism - that concepts are independent of epistemic capacities [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
Definable concepts have constituents, which are necessary, individuate them, and demonstrate possession [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / d. Concepts as prototypes
Many concepts lack prototypes, and complex prototypes aren't built from simple ones [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
The theory theory can't actually tell us what concepts are [Fodor]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
English has no semantic theory, just associations between sentences and thoughts [Fodor]