Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Elm and the Expert', 'Natural Goodness' and 'The Trouble with Being Born'

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61 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom only implies the knowledge achievable in any normal lifetime [Foot]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
So-called wisdom is just pondering things instead of acting [Cioran]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Systems are the worst despotism, in philosophy and in life [Cioran]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 3. Hermeneutics
A text explained ceases to be a text [Cioran]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
A standard naturalist view is realist, externalist, and computationalist, and believes in rationality [Fodor]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Psychology has to include the idea that mental processes are typically truth-preserving [Fodor]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
Inferences are surely part of the causal structure of the world [Fodor]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
Negation doesn't arise from reasoning, but from deep instincts [Cioran]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / i. Deflating being
The word 'being' is very tempting, but in fact means nothing at all [Cioran]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
People who really believe anti-realism don't bother to prove it [Cioran]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
Convictions are failures to study anything thoroughly [Cioran]
Opinions are fine, but having convictions means something has gone wrong [Cioran]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 5. Controlling Beliefs
Control of belief is possible if you know truth conditions and what causes beliefs [Fodor]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
Participation in an experiment requires agreement about what the outcome will mean [Fodor]
An experiment is a deliberate version of what informal thinking does all the time [Fodor]
We can deliberately cause ourselves to have true thoughts - hence the value of experiments [Fodor]
Interrogation and experiment submit us to having beliefs caused [Fodor]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Theories are links in the causal chain between the environment and our beliefs [Fodor]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind
I say psychology is intentional, semantics is informational, and thinking is computation [Fodor]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
We are probably the only creatures that can think about our own thoughts [Fodor]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
If people always acted without words we would take them for robots [Cioran]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
Cartesians consider interaction to be a miracle [Fodor]
Semantics v syntax is the interaction problem all over again [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Type physicalism equates mental kinds with physical kinds [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
Hume has no theory of the co-ordination of the mind [Fodor]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes
Propositional attitudes are propositions presented in a certain way [Fodor]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Rationality has mental properties - autonomy, productivity, experiment [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
XYZ (Twin Earth 'water') is an impossibility [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Truth conditions require a broad concept of content [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
Concepts aren't linked to stuff; they are what is caused by stuff [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
Knowing the cause of a thought is almost knowing its content [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 12. Informational Semantics
Is content basically information, fixed externally? [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
In the information view, concepts are potentials for making distinctions [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / a. Concepts and language
If only we could write like a reptile, of endless sensations and no concepts! [Cioran]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Semantic externalism says the concept 'elm' needs no further beliefs or inferences [Fodor]
If meaning is information, that establishes the causal link between the state of the world and our beliefs [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
To know the content of a thought is to know what would make it true [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
For holists no two thoughts are ever quite the same, which destroys faith in meaning [Fodor]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
It is claimed that reference doesn't fix sense (Jocasta), and sense doesn't fix reference (Twin Earth) [Fodor]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
Broad semantics holds that the basic semantic properties are truth and denotation [Fodor]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
Externalist semantics are necessary to connect the contents of beliefs with how the world is [Fodor]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
All criterions of practical rationality derive from goodness of will [Foot]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
We could only be responsible if we had consented before birth to who we are [Cioran]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 6. The Sublime
We morally dissolve if we spend time with excessive beauty [Cioran]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Moral reason is not just neutral, because morality is part of the standard of rationality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
Practical rationality must weigh both what is morally and what is non-morally required [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Moral virtues arise from human nature, as part of what makes us good human beings [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
Sterility is a human defect, but the choice to be childless is not [Foot]
Virtues are as necessary to humans as stings are to bees [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
Moral evaluations are not separate from facts, but concern particular facts about functioning [Foot]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Deep happiness usually comes from the basic things in life [Foot]
Happiness is enjoying the pursuit and attainment of right ends [Foot]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Good actions can never be justified by the good they brings to their agent [Foot]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 5. Free Rider
We all know that just pretending to be someone's friend is not the good life [Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
Someone is a good person because of their rational will, not their body or memory [Foot]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 3. Angst
In anxiety people cling to what reinforces it, because it is a deep need [Cioran]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
Fear cures boredom, because it is stronger [Cioran]
It is better to watch the hours pass, than trying to fill them [Cioran]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
Refraining from murder is not made good by authenticity or self-fulfilment [Foot]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
Suicide is pointless, because it always comes too late [Cioran]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / d. Heaven
The first man obviously found paradise unendurable [Cioran]