62 ideas
| 2463 | A standard naturalist view is realist, externalist, and computationalist, and believes in rationality [Fodor] |
| 9847 | A contextual definition permits the elimination of the expression by a substitution [Dummett] |
| 2435 | Psychology has to include the idea that mental processes are typically truth-preserving [Fodor] |
| 2442 | Inferences are surely part of the causal structure of the world [Fodor] |
| 9820 | In classical logic, logical truths are valid formulas; in higher-order logics they are purely logical [Dummett] |
| 9896 | A prime number is one which is measured by a unit alone [Dummett] |
| 18255 | Addition of quantities is prior to ordering, as shown in cyclic domains like angles [Dummett] |
| 9895 | A number is a multitude composed of units [Dummett] |
| 9852 | We understand 'there are as many nuts as apples' as easily by pairing them as by counting them [Dummett] |
| 9829 | The identity of a number may be fixed by something outside structure - by counting [Dummett] |
| 9828 | Numbers aren't fixed by position in a structure; it won't tell you whether to start with 0 or 1 [Dummett] |
| 9876 | Set theory isn't part of logic, and why reduce to something more complex? [Dummett] |
| 9884 | The distinction of concrete/abstract, or actual/non-actual, is a scale, not a dichotomy [Dummett] |
| 9869 | Realism is just the application of two-valued semantics to sentences [Dummett] |
| 14348 | An 'antidote' allows a manifestation to begin, but then blocks it [Corry] |
| 14347 | A 'finkish' disposition is one that is lost immediately after the appropriate stimulus [Corry] |
| 14350 | If a disposition is never instantiated, it shouldn't be part of our theory of nature [Corry] |
| 9880 | Nominalism assumes unmediated mental contact with objects [Dummett] |
| 9885 | The existence of abstract objects is a pseudo-problem [Dummett] |
| 9858 | Abstract objects nowadays are those which are objective but not actual [Dummett] |
| 9859 | It is absurd to deny the Equator, on the grounds that it lacks causal powers [Dummett] |
| 9860 | 'We've crossed the Equator' has truth-conditions, so accept the Equator - and it's an object [Dummett] |
| 9872 | Abstract objects need the context principle, since they can't be encountered directly [Dummett] |
| 9848 | Content is replaceable if identical, so replaceability can't define identity [Dummett, by Dummett] |
| 9842 | Frege introduced criteria for identity, but thought defining identity was circular [Dummett] |
| 2462 | Control of belief is possible if you know truth conditions and what causes beliefs [Fodor] |
| 2460 | Participation in an experiment requires agreement about what the outcome will mean [Fodor] |
| 2461 | An experiment is a deliberate version of what informal thinking does all the time [Fodor] |
| 2454 | We can deliberately cause ourselves to have true thoughts - hence the value of experiments [Fodor] |
| 2455 | Interrogation and experiment submit us to having beliefs caused [Fodor] |
| 14351 | Maybe an experiment unmasks an essential disposition, and reveals its regularities [Corry] |
| 2458 | Theories are links in the causal chain between the environment and our beliefs [Fodor] |
| 2443 | I say psychology is intentional, semantics is informational, and thinking is computation [Fodor] |
| 2453 | We are probably the only creatures that can think about our own thoughts [Fodor] |
| 2446 | Cartesians consider interaction to be a miracle [Fodor] |
| 2445 | Semantics v syntax is the interaction problem all over again [Fodor] |
| 2464 | Type physicalism equates mental kinds with physical kinds [Fodor] |
| 2447 | Hume has no theory of the co-ordination of the mind [Fodor] |
| 2440 | Propositional attitudes are propositions presented in a certain way [Fodor] |
| 2450 | Rationality has mental properties - autonomy, productivity, experiment [Fodor] |
| 2437 | XYZ (Twin Earth 'water') is an impossibility [Fodor] |
| 2441 | Truth conditions require a broad concept of content [Fodor] |
| 3114 | Concepts aren't linked to stuff; they are what is caused by stuff [Fodor] |
| 2452 | Knowing the cause of a thought is almost knowing its content [Fodor] |
| 2432 | Is content basically information, fixed externally? [Fodor] |
| 2438 | In the information view, concepts are potentials for making distinctions [Fodor] |
| 9849 | Maybe a concept is 'prior' to another if it can be defined without the second concept [Dummett] |
| 9850 | An argument for conceptual priority is greater simplicity in explanation [Dummett] |
| 9873 | Abstract terms are acceptable as long as we know how they function linguistically [Dummett] |
| 9993 | There is no reason why abstraction by equivalence classes should be called 'logical' [Dummett, by Tait] |
| 9857 | We arrive at the concept 'suicide' by comparing 'Cato killed Cato' with 'Brutus killed Brutus' [Dummett] |
| 9833 | To abstract from spoons (to get the same number as the forks), the spoons must be indistinguishable too [Dummett] |
| 2439 | Semantic externalism says the concept 'elm' needs no further beliefs or inferences [Fodor] |
| 2457 | If meaning is information, that establishes the causal link between the state of the world and our beliefs [Fodor] |
| 2451 | To know the content of a thought is to know what would make it true [Fodor] |
| 2433 | For holists no two thoughts are ever quite the same, which destroys faith in meaning [Fodor] |
| 2436 | It is claimed that reference doesn't fix sense (Jocasta), and sense doesn't fix reference (Twin Earth) [Fodor] |
| 2434 | Broad semantics holds that the basic semantic properties are truth and denotation [Fodor] |
| 9836 | Fregean semantics assumes a domain articulated into individual objects [Dummett] |
| 2459 | Externalist semantics are necessary to connect the contents of beliefs with how the world is [Fodor] |
| 14346 | Dispositional essentialism says fundamental laws of nature are strict, not ceteris paribus [Corry] |
| 18257 | Why should the limit of measurement be points, not intervals? [Dummett] |