12 ideas
12177 | Human artefacts may have essences, in their purposes [Popper] |
17535 | Dispositionality has its own distinctive type of modality [Mumford/Anjum] |
3978 | Associations are held to connect Ideas together in the way the world is connected together [Fodor] |
12176 | Science does not aim at ultimate explanations [Popper] |
3976 | Intentional science needs objects with semantic and causal properties, and which obey laws [Fodor] |
3980 | Intentional states and processes may be causal relations among mental symbols [Fodor] |
3981 | Most psychological properties seem to be multiply realisable [Fodor] |
3975 | Folk psychology explains behaviour by reference to intentional states like belief and desire [Fodor] |
3982 | How could the extrinsic properties of thoughts supervene on their intrinsic properties? [Fodor] |
12175 | Galilean science aimed at true essences, as the ultimate explanations [Popper] |
12179 | Essentialist views of science prevent further questions from being raised [Popper] |
3977 | Laws are true generalisations which support counterfactuals and are confirmed by instances [Fodor] |