18 ideas
16657 | Substance, Quantity and Quality are real; other categories depend on those three [Henry of Ghent] |
16658 | The only reality in the category of Relation is things from another category [Henry of Ghent] |
16645 | Accidents are diminished beings, because they are dispositions of substance (unqualified being) [Henry of Ghent] |
19718 | Indefeasibility does not imply infallibility [Grundmann] |
22012 | Kant says things-in-themselves cause sensations, but then makes causation transcendental! [Henry of Ghent, by Pinkard] |
3978 | Associations are held to connect Ideas together in the way the world is connected together [Fodor] |
19717 | Can a defeater itself be defeated? [Grundmann] |
19716 | Simple reliabilism can't cope with defeaters of reliably produced beliefs [Grundmann] |
19715 | You can 'rebut' previous beliefs, 'undercut' the power of evidence, or 'reason-defeat' the truth [Grundmann] |
19714 | Knowledge requires that there are no facts which would defeat its justification [Grundmann] |
19713 | Defeasibility theory needs to exclude defeaters which are true but misleading [Grundmann] |
19719 | 'Moderate' foundationalism has basic justification which is defeasible [Grundmann] |
3976 | Intentional science needs objects with semantic and causal properties, and which obey laws [Fodor] |
3980 | Intentional states and processes may be causal relations among mental symbols [Fodor] |
3981 | Most psychological properties seem to be multiply realisable [Fodor] |
3975 | Folk psychology explains behaviour by reference to intentional states like belief and desire [Fodor] |
3982 | How could the extrinsic properties of thoughts supervene on their intrinsic properties? [Fodor] |
3977 | Laws are true generalisations which support counterfactuals and are confirmed by instances [Fodor] |