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All the ideas for 'Jerry A. Fodor on himself', 'Subjective and Objective' and 'Explanation - Opening Address'

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24 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
17070 Coherence is consilience, simplicity, analogy, and fitting into a web of belief [Smart]
17072 We need comprehensiveness, as well as self-coherence [Smart]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
3296 Sense-data are a false objectification of what is essentially subjective [Nagel]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
3978 Associations are held to connect Ideas together in the way the world is connected together [Fodor]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
17073 I simply reject evidence, if it is totally contrary to my web of belief [Smart]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / c. Direction of explanation
17077 The height of a flagpole could be fixed by its angle of shadow, but that would be very unusual [Smart]
17078 Universe expansion explains the red shift, but not vice versa [Smart]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
17074 Explanations are bad by fitting badly with a web of beliefs, or fitting well into a bad web [Smart]
17076 Deducing from laws is one possible way to achieve a coherent explanation [Smart]
17061 Explanation of a fact is fitting it into a system of beliefs [Smart]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / d. Consilience
17071 An explanation is better if it also explains phenomena from a different field [Smart]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
17062 If scientific explanation is causal, that rules out mathematical explanation [Smart]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
17075 Scientific explanation tends to reduce things to the unfamiliar (not the familiar) [Smart]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
3295 Inner v outer brings astonishment that we are a particular person [Nagel]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
3976 Intentional science needs objects with semantic and causal properties, and which obey laws [Fodor]
3980 Intentional states and processes may be causal relations among mental symbols [Fodor]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
3293 If you assert that we have an ego, you can still ask if that future ego will be me [Nagel]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
3292 The most difficult problem of free will is saying what the problem is [Nagel]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
3981 Most psychological properties seem to be multiply realisable [Fodor]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
3975 Folk psychology explains behaviour by reference to intentional states like belief and desire [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
3982 How could the extrinsic properties of thoughts supervene on their intrinsic properties? [Fodor]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
3294 As far as possible we should become instruments to realise what is best from an eternal point of view [Nagel]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
3977 Laws are true generalisations which support counterfactuals and are confirmed by instances [Fodor]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / b. General relativity
17063 Unlike Newton, Einstein's general theory explains the perihelion of Mercury [Smart]