Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Jerry A. Fodor on himself', 'The Philosophy of Philosophy' and 'Zettel'

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23 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
2626 A philosopher is outside any community of ideas [Wittgenstein]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
9593 Progress in philosophy is incremental, not an immature seeking after drama [Williamson]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
9594 Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
6569 'This sentence is false' sends us in a looping search for its proposition [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
9601 The realist/anti-realist debate is notoriously obscure and fruitless [Williamson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
9599 There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain [Williamson]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
9602 Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
9598 Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
16536 Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals [Lowe on Williamson]
9596 We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals [Williamson]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
9597 There are 'armchair' truths which are not a priori, because experience was involved [Williamson]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
3978 Associations are held to connect Ideas together in the way the world is connected together [Fodor]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
9592 Intuition is neither powerful nor vacuous, but reveals linguistic or conceptual competence [Williamson]
20181 When analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they present intuitions as their evidence [Williamson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
3790 Causes of beliefs are irrelevant to their contents [Wittgenstein]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
3976 Intentional science needs objects with semantic and causal properties, and which obey laws [Fodor]
3980 Intentional states and processes may be causal relations among mental symbols [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
3981 Most psychological properties seem to be multiply realisable [Fodor]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
3975 Folk psychology explains behaviour by reference to intentional states like belief and desire [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
3982 How could the extrinsic properties of thoughts supervene on their intrinsic properties? [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
9595 You might know that the word 'gob' meant 'mouth', but not be competent to use it [Williamson]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 5. Culture
9600 If languages are intertranslatable, and cognition is innate, then cultures are all similar [Williamson]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
3977 Laws are true generalisations which support counterfactuals and are confirmed by instances [Fodor]