28 ideas
| 7740 | There exists a realm, beyond objects and ideas, of non-spatio-temporal thoughts [Frege, by Weiner] |
| 19466 | The word 'true' seems to be unique and indefinable [Frege] |
| 12442 | 'Mickey Mouse is a fictional mouse' is true without a truthmaker [Azzouni] |
| 19465 | There cannot be complete correspondence, because ideas and reality are quite different [Frege] |
| 19468 | The property of truth in 'It is true that I smell violets' adds nothing to 'I smell violets' [Frege] |
| 12439 | Truth is dispensable, by replacing truth claims with the sentence itself [Azzouni] |
| 12437 | Truth lets us assent to sentences we can't explicitly exhibit [Azzouni] |
| 12446 | Names function the same way, even if there is no object [Azzouni] |
| 19470 | Thoughts in the 'third realm' cannot be sensed, and do not need an owner to exist [Frege] |
| 12447 | That all existents have causal powers is unknowable; the claim is simply an epistemic one [Azzouni] |
| 7771 | We need 'events' to explain adverbs, which are adjectival predicates of events [Davidson, by Lycan] |
| 8860 | Language-learning is not good enough evidence for the existence of events [Yablo on Davidson] |
| 12445 | If fictional objects really don't exist, then they aren't abstract objects [Azzouni] |
| 19471 | A fact is a thought that is true [Frege] |
| 12449 | Modern metaphysics often derives ontology from the logical forms of sentences [Azzouni] |
| 12440 | If objectual quantifiers ontologically commit, so does the metalanguage for its semantics [Azzouni] |
| 15002 | If the best theory of adverbs refers to events, then our ontology should include events [Davidson, by Sider] |
| 12438 | In the vernacular there is no unequivocal ontological commitment [Azzouni] |
| 12441 | We only get ontology from semantics if we have already smuggled it in [Azzouni] |
| 9877 | Late Frege saw his non-actual objective objects as exclusively thoughts and senses [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 12448 | Things that don't exist don't have any properties [Azzouni] |
| 19469 | We grasp thoughts (thinking), decide they are true (judgement), and manifest the judgement (assertion) [Frege] |
| 8162 | Thoughts have their own realm of reality - 'sense' (as opposed to the realm of 'reference') [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 9818 | A thought is distinguished from other things by a capacity to be true or false [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 16379 | Thoughts about myself are understood one way to me, and another when communicated [Frege] |
| 19467 | A 'thought' is something for which the question of truth can arise; thoughts are senses of sentences [Frege] |
| 19472 | A sentence is only a thought if it is complete, and has a time-specification [Frege] |
| 12450 | The periodic table not only defines the elements, but also excludes other possible elements [Azzouni] |