32 ideas
22024 | Fichte's subjectivity struggles to then give any account of objectivity [Pinkard on Fichte] |
5331 | You can't infer that because you have a hidden birth-mark, everybody else does [Ayer] |
22017 | Normativity needs the possibility of negation, in affirmation and denial [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
2611 | It is currently held that quantifying over something implies belief in its existence [Ayer] |
16520 | We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual [Ayer] |
22018 | Necessary truths derive from basic assertion and negation [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
22064 | Fichte's logic is much too narrow, and doesn't deduce ethics, art, society or life [Schlegel,F on Fichte] |
22032 | Fichte's key claim was that the subjective-objective distinction must itself be subjective [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
22020 | We only see ourselves as self-conscious and rational in relation to other rationalities [Fichte] |
2613 | The theory of other minds has no rival [Ayer] |
5328 | Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds [Ayer] |
5330 | Physicalism undercuts the other mind problem, by equating experience with 'public' brain events [Ayer] |
22060 | The Self is the spontaneity, self-relatedness and unity needed for knowledge [Fichte, by Siep] |
22066 | Novalis sought a much wider concept of the ego than Fichte's proposal [Novalis on Fichte] |
22016 | The self is not a 'thing', but what emerges from an assertion of normativity [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
5326 | Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements [Ayer] |
5325 | Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject? [Ayer] |
22019 | Consciousness of an object always entails awareness of the self [Fichte] |
5324 | Bodily identity and memory work together to establish personal identity [Ayer] |
5952 | Rather than being the whole soul, maybe I am its chief part? [Plutarch] |
5322 | Self-consciousness is not basic, because experiences are not instrinsically marked with ownership [Ayer] |
5327 | Temporal gaps in the consciousness of a spirit could not be bridged by memories [Ayer] |
5329 | Why shouldn't we say brain depends on mind? Better explanation! [Ayer] |
5951 | If atoms have no qualities, they cannot possibly produce a mind [Plutarch] |
22061 | Judgement is distinguishing concepts, and seeing their relations [Fichte, by Siep] |
2610 | Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences [Ayer] |
20796 | Action needs an affinity for a presentation, and an impulse toward the affinity [Plutarch] |
22023 | Fichte's idea of spontaneity implied that nothing counts unless we give it status [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
5948 | The good life involves social participation, loyalty, temperance and honesty [Plutarch] |
22065 | Fichte reduces nature to a lifeless immobility [Schlegel,F on Fichte] |
5950 | If only atoms exist, how do qualities arise when the atoms come together? [Plutarch] |
5955 | No one will ever find a city that lacks religious practices [Plutarch] |