Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Definitions' and 'Public Text and Common Reader'

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25 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
21970 Philosophy attains its goal if one person feels perfect accord between their system and experience [Fichte]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
6912 For Fichte there is no God outside the ego, and 'our religion is reason' [Fichte, by Feuerbach]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
11215 Notable definitions have been of piety (Plato), God (Anselm), number (Frege), and truth (Tarski) [Gupta]
11223 Definitions usually have a term, a 'definiendum' containing the term, and a defining 'definiens' [Gupta]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
11225 A definition needs to apply to the same object across possible worlds [Gupta]
11227 The 'revision theory' says that definitions are rules for improving output [Gupta]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 3. Types of Definition
11221 A definition can be 'extensionally', 'intensionally' or 'sense' adequate [Gupta]
11224 Traditional definitions are general identities, which are sentential and reductive [Gupta]
11226 Traditional definitions need: same category, mention of the term, and conservativeness and eliminability [Gupta]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
11217 Chemists aim at real definition of things; lexicographers aim at nominal definition of usage [Gupta]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
11216 If definitions aim at different ideals, then defining essence is not a unitary activity [Gupta]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 10. Stipulative Definition
11218 Stipulative definition assigns meaning to a term, ignoring prior meanings [Gupta]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 11. Ostensive Definition
11220 Ostensive definitions look simple, but are complex and barely explicable [Gupta]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 6. Ordering in Sets
11222 The ordered pair <x,y> is defined as the set {{x},{x,y}}, capturing function, not meaning [Gupta]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
21973 Fichte believed in things-in-themselves [Fichte, by Moore,AW]
21914 We can deduce experience from self-consciousness, without the thing-in-itself [Fichte]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
20951 The absolute I divides into consciousness, and a world which is not-I [Fichte, by Bowie]
21964 Reason arises from freedom, so philosophy starts from the self, and not from the laws of nature [Fichte]
21968 Abandon the thing-in-itself; things only exist in relation to our thinking [Fichte]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
21965 Spinoza could not actually believe his determinism, because living requires free will [Fichte]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 3. Taste
12163 Literary meaning emerges in comparisons, and tradition shows which comparisons are relevant [Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 5. Art as Language
12162 In literature, word replacement changes literary meaning [Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 1. Artistic Intentions
12159 Without intentions we can't perceive sculpture, but that is not the whole story [Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 3. Artistic Representation
12160 In aesthetic interest, even what is true is treated as though it were not [Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 5. Objectivism in Art
12161 We can be objective about conventions, but love of art is needed to understand its traditions [Scruton]