Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Science of Knowing (Wissenschaftslehre) [1st ed]', 'Some Judgements of Perception' and 'Grundgesetze der Arithmetik 1 (Basic Laws)'

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23 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
22024 Fichte's subjectivity struggles to then give any account of objectivity [Pinkard on Fichte]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
22017 Normativity needs the possibility of negation, in affirmation and denial [Fichte, by Pinkard]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
13733 Frege considered definite descriptions to be genuine singular terms [Frege, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
9874 Contradiction arises from Frege's substitutional account of second-order quantification [Dummett on Frege]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
18252 Real numbers are ratios of quantities, such as lengths or masses [Frege]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
18271 We can't prove everything, but we can spell out the unproved, so that foundations are clear [Frege]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
10623 Frege defined number in terms of extensions of concepts, but needed Basic Law V to explain extensions [Frege, by Hale/Wright]
9975 Frege ignored Cantor's warning that a cardinal set is not just a concept-extension [Tait on Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
18165 My Basic Law V is a law of pure logic [Frege]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
22018 Necessary truths derive from basic assertion and negation [Fichte, by Pinkard]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
20147 Arguments that my finger does not exist are less certain than your seeing my finger [Moore,GE]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
22064 Fichte's logic is much too narrow, and doesn't deduce ethics, art, society or life [Schlegel,F on Fichte]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
22032 Fichte's key claim was that the subjective-objective distinction must itself be subjective [Fichte, by Pinkard]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / a. Other minds
22020 We only see ourselves as self-conscious and rational in relation to other rationalities [Fichte]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
22060 The Self is the spontaneity, self-relatedness and unity needed for knowledge [Fichte, by Siep]
22066 Novalis sought a much wider concept of the ego than Fichte's proposal [Novalis on Fichte]
22016 The self is not a 'thing', but what emerges from an assertion of normativity [Fichte, by Pinkard]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
22019 Consciousness of an object always entails awareness of the self [Fichte]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
22061 Judgement is distinguishing concepts, and seeing their relations [Fichte, by Siep]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
9190 A concept is a function mapping objects onto truth-values, if they fall under the concept [Frege, by Dummett]
13665 Frege took the study of concepts to be part of logic [Frege, by Shapiro]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
22023 Fichte's idea of spontaneity implied that nothing counts unless we give it status [Fichte, by Pinkard]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
22065 Fichte reduces nature to a lifeless immobility [Schlegel,F on Fichte]