Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Science of Knowing (Wissenschaftslehre) [1st ed]', 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Mathematics' and 'Killing in War'

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57 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Fichte's subjectivity struggles to then give any account of objectivity [Pinkard on Fichte]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 2. Intuitionist Logic
Rejecting double negation elimination undermines reductio proofs [Colyvan]
Showing a disproof is impossible is not a proof, so don't eliminate double negation [Colyvan]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Excluded middle says P or not-P; bivalence says P is either true or false [Colyvan]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
Normativity needs the possibility of negation, in affirmation and denial [Fichte, by Pinkard]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
Löwenheim proved his result for a first-order sentence, and Skolem generalised it [Colyvan]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
Axioms are 'categorical' if all of their models are isomorphic [Colyvan]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
Ordinal numbers represent order relations [Colyvan]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
Intuitionists only accept a few safe infinities [Colyvan]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / j. Infinite divisibility
Infinitesimals were sometimes zero, and sometimes close to zero [Colyvan]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
Reducing real numbers to rationals suggested arithmetic as the foundation of maths [Colyvan]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / f. Mathematical induction
Transfinite induction moves from all cases, up to the limit ordinal [Colyvan]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
Most mathematical proofs are using set theory, but without saying so [Colyvan]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
Structuralism say only 'up to isomorphism' matters because that is all there is to it [Colyvan]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
If 'in re' structures relies on the world, does the world contain rich enough structures? [Colyvan]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
Necessary truths derive from basic assertion and negation [Fichte, by Pinkard]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
Fichte's logic is much too narrow, and doesn't deduce ethics, art, society or life [Schlegel,F on Fichte]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
Fichte's key claim was that the subjective-objective distinction must itself be subjective [Fichte, by Pinkard]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
Probability supports Bayesianism better as degrees of belief than as ratios of frequencies [Colyvan]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
Mathematics can reveal structural similarities in diverse systems [Colyvan]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / f. Necessity in explanations
Mathematics can show why some surprising events have to occur [Colyvan]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / m. Explanation by proof
Proof by cases (by 'exhaustion') is said to be unexplanatory [Colyvan]
Reductio proofs do not seem to be very explanatory [Colyvan]
If inductive proofs hold because of the structure of natural numbers, they may explain theorems [Colyvan]
Can a proof that no one understands (of the four-colour theorem) really be a proof? [Colyvan]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / a. Other minds
We only see ourselves as self-conscious and rational in relation to other rationalities [Fichte]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
Mathematical generalisation is by extending a system, or by abstracting away from it [Colyvan]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
The Self is the spontaneity, self-relatedness and unity needed for knowledge [Fichte, by Siep]
Novalis sought a much wider concept of the ego than Fichte's proposal [Novalis on Fichte]
The self is not a 'thing', but what emerges from an assertion of normativity [Fichte, by Pinkard]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
Consciousness of an object always entails awareness of the self [Fichte]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
Judgement is distinguishing concepts, and seeing their relations [Fichte, by Siep]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
Legal excuses are duress, ignorance, and diminished responsibility [McMahan]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
Fichte's idea of spontaneity implied that nothing counts unless we give it status [Fichte, by Pinkard]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Liberty Rights are permissions, and Claim Rights are freedom from intervention [McMahan]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
A person or state may be attacked if they are responsible for an unjustified threat [McMahan]
You (e.g. a police officer) are not liable to attack just because you pose a threat [McMahan]
Wars can be unjust, despite a just cause, if they are unnecessary or excessive or of mixed cause [McMahan]
Just war theory says all and only persons posing a threat are liable to attack [McMahan]
The worst unjustified wars have no aim at all [McMahan]
A defensive war is unjust, if it is responding to a just war [McMahan]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / b. Justice in war
Proportionality in fighting can't be judged independently of the justice of each side [McMahan]
Can an army start an unjust war, and then fight justly to defend their own civilians? [McMahan]
Soldiers cannot freely fight in unjust wars, just because they behave well when fighting [McMahan]
The law of war differs from criminal law; attacking just combatants is immoral, but legal [McMahan]
If the unjust combatants are morally excused they are innocent, so how can they be killed? [McMahan]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / c. Combatants
You don't become a legitimate target, just because you violently resist an unjust attack [McMahan]
If all combatants are seen as morally equal, that facilitates starting unjust wars [McMahan]
Volunteer soldiers accept the risk of attack, but they don't agree to it, or to their deaths [McMahan]
If being part of a big collective relieves soldiers of moral responsibility, why not the leaders too? [McMahan]
If soldiers can't refuse to fight in unjust wars, can they choose to fight in just wars? [McMahan]
Equality is both sides have permission, or both sides are justified, or one justified the other permitted [McMahan]
Fighting unjustly under duress does not justify it, or permit it, but it may excuse it [McMahan]
Soldiers cannot know enough facts to evaluate the justice of their war [McMahan]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / d. Non-combatants
Innocence implies not being morally responsible, rather than merely being guiltless [McMahan]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / e. Peace
Unconditional surrender can't be demanded, since evil losers still have legitimate conditions [McMahan]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Fichte reduces nature to a lifeless immobility [Schlegel,F on Fichte]