43 ideas
| 22024 | Fichte's subjectivity struggles to then give any account of objectivity [Pinkard on Fichte] |
| 3593 | The only way to specify the corresponding fact is asserting the sentence [Williams,M] |
| 3585 | Coherence needs positive links, not just absence of conflict [Williams,M] |
| 3584 | Justification needs coherence, while truth might be ideal coherence [Williams,M] |
| 3599 | Deduction shows entailments, not what to believe [Williams,M] |
| 22017 | Normativity needs the possibility of negation, in affirmation and denial [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
| 22018 | Necessary truths derive from basic assertion and negation [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
| 3591 | We could never pin down how many beliefs we have [Williams,M] |
| 3582 | Propositions make error possible, so basic experiential knowledge is impossible [Williams,M] |
| 3592 | Phenomenalism is a form of idealism [Williams,M] |
| 22064 | Fichte's logic is much too narrow, and doesn't deduce ethics, art, society or life [Schlegel,F on Fichte] |
| 22032 | Fichte's key claim was that the subjective-objective distinction must itself be subjective [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
| 3579 | Sense data avoid the danger of misrepresenting the world [Williams,M] |
| 3581 | Sense data can't give us knowledge if they are non-propositional [Williams,M] |
| 3564 | Is it people who are justified, or propositions? [Williams,M] |
| 3595 | What works always takes precedence over theories [Williams,M] |
| 3580 | Experience must be meaningful to act as foundations [Williams,M] |
| 3578 | Are empirical foundations judgements or experiences? [Williams,M] |
| 3576 | Foundationalists are torn between adequacy and security [Williams,M] |
| 3577 | Strong justification eliminates error, but also reduces our true beliefs [Williams,M] |
| 3589 | Why should diverse parts of our knowledge be connected? [Williams,M] |
| 3590 | Coherence theory must give a foundational status to coherence itself [Williams,M] |
| 3571 | Externalism does not require knowing that you know [Williams,M] |
| 3574 | Externalism ignores the social aspect of knowledge [Williams,M] |
| 3586 | Only a belief can justify a belief [Williams,M] |
| 3567 | How could there be causal relations to mathematical facts? [Williams,M] |
| 3569 | In the causal theory of knowledge the facts must cause the belief [Williams,M] |
| 3573 | Externalist reliability refers to a range of conventional conditions [Williams,M] |
| 3565 | Sometimes I ought to distrust sources which are actually reliable [Williams,M] |
| 3566 | We control our beliefs by virtue of how we enquire [Williams,M] |
| 3594 | Scepticism just reveals our limited ability to explain things [Williams,M] |
| 3575 | Scepticism can involve discrepancy, relativity, infinity, assumption and circularity [Williams,M] |
| 3587 | Seeing electrons in a cloud chamber requires theory [Williams,M] |
| 22020 | We only see ourselves as self-conscious and rational in relation to other rationalities [Fichte] |
| 22060 | The Self is the spontaneity, self-relatedness and unity needed for knowledge [Fichte, by Siep] |
| 22066 | Novalis sought a much wider concept of the ego than Fichte's proposal [Novalis on Fichte] |
| 22016 | The self is not a 'thing', but what emerges from an assertion of normativity [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
| 22019 | Consciousness of an object always entails awareness of the self [Fichte] |
| 22061 | Judgement is distinguishing concepts, and seeing their relations [Fichte, by Siep] |
| 3588 | Foundationalists base meaning in words, coherentists base it in sentences [Williams,M] |
| 18033 | The meaning of a representation is its role in thought, perception or decisions [Block] |
| 22023 | Fichte's idea of spontaneity implied that nothing counts unless we give it status [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
| 22065 | Fichte reduces nature to a lifeless immobility [Schlegel,F on Fichte] |