29 ideas
22024 | Fichte's subjectivity struggles to then give any account of objectivity [Pinkard on Fichte] |
4901 | Truth has to be correspondence to facts, and a match between relations of ideas and relations in the world [Perry] |
22017 | Normativity needs the possibility of negation, in affirmation and denial [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
4885 | Identity is a very weak relation, which doesn't require interdefinability, or shared properties [Perry] |
22018 | Necessary truths derive from basic assertion and negation [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
4899 | Possible worlds thinking has clarified the logic of modality, but is problematic in epistemology [Perry] |
4898 | Possible worlds are indices for a language, or concrete realities, or abstract possibilities [Perry] |
22064 | Fichte's logic is much too narrow, and doesn't deduce ethics, art, society or life [Schlegel,F on Fichte] |
22032 | Fichte's key claim was that the subjective-objective distinction must itself be subjective [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
4887 | We try to cause other things to occur by causing mental events to occur [Perry] |
22020 | We only see ourselves as self-conscious and rational in relation to other rationalities [Fichte] |
4884 | Brain states must be in my head, and yet the pain seems to be in my hand [Perry] |
4888 | It seems plausible that many animals have experiences without knowing about them [Perry] |
22060 | The Self is the spontaneity, self-relatedness and unity needed for knowledge [Fichte, by Siep] |
22066 | Novalis sought a much wider concept of the ego than Fichte's proposal [Novalis on Fichte] |
22016 | The self is not a 'thing', but what emerges from an assertion of normativity [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
22019 | Consciousness of an object always entails awareness of the self [Fichte] |
3157 | T.H.Huxley gave the earliest clear statement of epiphenomenalism [Huxley, by Rey] |
3154 | Brain causes mind, but it doesn't seem that mind causes actions [Huxley] |
4891 | If epiphenomenalism just says mental events are effects but not causes, it is consistent with physicalism [Perry] |
4900 | Prior to Kripke, the mind-brain identity theory usually claimed that the identity was contingent [Perry] |
4892 | If physicalists stick with identity (not supervenience), Martian pain will not be like ours [Perry] |
22061 | Judgement is distinguishing concepts, and seeing their relations [Fichte, by Siep] |
4889 | Although we may classify ideas by content, we individuate them differently, as their content can change [Perry] |
4896 | The intension of an expression is a function from possible worlds to an appropriate extension [Perry] |
4897 | A proposition is a set of possible worlds for which its intension delivers truth [Perry] |
4890 | A sharp analytic/synthetic line can rarely be drawn, but some concepts are central to thought [Perry] |
22023 | Fichte's idea of spontaneity implied that nothing counts unless we give it status [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
22065 | Fichte reduces nature to a lifeless immobility [Schlegel,F on Fichte] |