34 ideas
| 22024 | Fichte's subjectivity struggles to then give any account of objectivity [Pinkard on Fichte] |
| 16877 | A 'constructive' (as opposed to 'analytic') definition creates a new sign [Frege] |
| 11219 | Frege suggested that mathematics should only accept stipulative definitions [Frege, by Gupta] |
| 16878 | We must be clear about every premise and every law used in a proof [Frege] |
| 16867 | Logic not only proves things, but also reveals logical relations between them [Frege] |
| 16863 | Does some mathematical reasoning (such as mathematical induction) not belong to logic? [Frege] |
| 16862 | The closest subject to logic is mathematics, which does little apart from drawing inferences [Frege] |
| 22017 | Normativity needs the possibility of negation, in affirmation and denial [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
| 16865 | 'Theorems' are both proved, and used in proofs [Frege] |
| 16866 | Tracing inference backwards closes in on a small set of axioms and postulates [Frege] |
| 16868 | The essence of mathematics is the kernel of primitive truths on which it rests [Frege] |
| 16871 | A truth can be an axiom in one system and not in another [Frege] |
| 16870 | Axioms are truths which cannot be doubted, and for which no proof is needed [Frege] |
| 16869 | To create order in mathematics we need a full system, guided by patterns of inference [Frege] |
| 16864 | If principles are provable, they are theorems; if not, they are axioms [Frege] |
| 4242 | Pure supervenience explains nothing, and is a sign of something fundamental we don't know [Nagel] |
| 9388 | Every concept must have a sharp boundary; we cannot allow an indeterminate third case [Frege] |
| 22018 | Necessary truths derive from basic assertion and negation [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
| 22064 | Fichte's logic is much too narrow, and doesn't deduce ethics, art, society or life [Schlegel,F on Fichte] |
| 22032 | Fichte's key claim was that the subjective-objective distinction must itself be subjective [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
| 22020 | We only see ourselves as self-conscious and rational in relation to other rationalities [Fichte] |
| 22060 | The Self is the spontaneity, self-relatedness and unity needed for knowledge [Fichte, by Siep] |
| 22066 | Novalis sought a much wider concept of the ego than Fichte's proposal [Novalis on Fichte] |
| 22016 | The self is not a 'thing', but what emerges from an assertion of normativity [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
| 22019 | Consciousness of an object always entails awareness of the self [Fichte] |
| 22061 | Judgement is distinguishing concepts, and seeing their relations [Fichte, by Siep] |
| 16876 | We need definitions to cram retrievable sense into a signed receptacle [Frege] |
| 16875 | We use signs to mark receptacles for complex senses [Frege] |
| 16879 | A sign won't gain sense just from being used in sentences with familiar components [Frege] |
| 16873 | Thoughts are not subjective or psychological, because some thoughts are the same for us all [Frege] |
| 16872 | A thought is the sense expressed by a sentence, and is what we prove [Frege] |
| 16874 | The parts of a thought map onto the parts of a sentence [Frege] |
| 22023 | Fichte's idea of spontaneity implied that nothing counts unless we give it status [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
| 22065 | Fichte reduces nature to a lifeless immobility [Schlegel,F on Fichte] |