Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Ordinatio' and 'Conceptual truth and metaphysical necessity'

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18 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
21970 Philosophy attains its goal if one person feels perfect accord between their system and experience [Fichte]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
6912 For Fichte there is no God outside the ego, and 'our religion is reason' [Fichte, by Feuerbach]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
9103 A universal is not a real feature of objects, but only a thought-object in the mind [William of Ockham]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
16423 Conceptual possibilities are metaphysical possibilities we can conceive of [Stalnaker]
16422 The necessity of a proposition concerns reality, not our words or concepts [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
16421 Critics say there are just an a priori necessary part, and an a posteriori contingent part [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
16429 A 'centred' world is an ordered triple of world, individual and time [Stalnaker]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
21973 Fichte believed in things-in-themselves [Fichte, by Moore,AW]
21914 We can deduce experience from self-consciousness, without the thing-in-itself [Fichte]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
20951 The absolute I divides into consciousness, and a world which is not-I [Fichte, by Bowie]
21964 Reason arises from freedom, so philosophy starts from the self, and not from the laws of nature [Fichte]
21968 Abandon the thing-in-itself; things only exist in relation to our thinking [Fichte]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
21965 Spinoza could not actually believe his determinism, because living requires free will [Fichte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
16428 Meanings aren't in the head, but that is because they are abstract [Stalnaker]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
9104 A universal is the result of abstraction, which is only a kind of mental picturing [William of Ockham]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
16432 One view says the causal story is built into the description that is the name's content [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
16430 Two-D says that a posteriori is primary and contingent, and the necessity is the secondary intension [Stalnaker]
16431 In one view, the secondary intension is metasemantic, about how the thinker relates to the content [Stalnaker]