45 ideas
6095 | The business of metaphysics is to describe the world [Russell] |
6106 | Reducing entities and premisses makes error less likely [Russell] |
6090 | Facts make propositions true or false, and are expressed by whole sentences [Russell] |
18348 | Not only atomic truths, but also general and negative truths, have truth-makers [Russell, by Rami] |
6103 | Normally a class with only one member is a problem, because the class and the member are identical [Russell] |
6092 | In a logically perfect language, there will be just one word for every simple object [Russell] |
6101 | Romulus does not occur in the proposition 'Romulus did not exist' [Russell] |
6102 | You can understand 'author of Waverley', but to understand 'Scott' you must know who it applies to [Russell] |
10423 | There are a set of criteria for pinning down a logically proper name [Russell, by Sainsbury] |
7744 | Treat description using quantifiers, and treat proper names as descriptions [Russell, by McCullogh] |
7306 | If the only property of a name was its reference, we couldn't explain bearerless names [Miller,A] |
10426 | A name has got to name something or it is not a name [Russell] |
6104 | Numbers are classes of classes, and hence fictions of fictions [Russell] |
21708 | Russell's new logical atomist was of particulars, universals and facts (not platonic propositions) [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
19051 | Russell's atomic facts are actually compounds, and his true logical atoms are sense data [Russell, by Quine] |
6089 | Logical atomism aims at logical atoms as the last residue of analysis [Russell] |
6100 | Once you have enumerated all the atomic facts, there is a further fact that those are all the facts [Russell] |
6105 | Logical atoms aims to get down to ultimate simples, with their own unique reality [Russell] |
21709 | You can't name all the facts, so they are not real, but are what propositions assert [Russell] |
18376 | Russell asserts atomic, existential, negative and general facts [Russell, by Armstrong] |
5465 | Modern trope theory tries, like logical atomism, to reduce things to elementary states [Russell, by Ellis] |
6060 | 'Existence' means that a propositional function is sometimes true [Russell] |
10467 | Individuals consist of 'compresent' tropes [Bacon,John] |
10464 | A trope is a bit of a property or relation (not an exemplification or a quality) [Bacon,John] |
10465 | Trope theory is ontologically parsimonious, with possibly only one-category [Bacon,John] |
6099 | Modal terms are properties of propositional functions, not of propositions [Russell] |
10466 | Maybe possible worlds are just sets of possible tropes [Bacon,John] |
6098 | Perception goes straight to the fact, and not through the proposition [Russell] |
7322 | Constitutive scepticism is about facts, and epistemological scepticism about our ability to know them [Miller,A] |
7325 | Dispositions say what we will do, not what we ought to do, so can't explain normativity [Miller,A] |
6097 | The theory of error seems to need the existence of the non-existent [Russell] |
7324 | Explain meaning by propositional attitudes, or vice versa, or together? [Miller,A] |
9022 | Russell uses 'propositional function' to refer to both predicates and to attributes [Quine on Russell] |
7323 | If truth is deflationary, sentence truth-conditions just need good declarative syntax [Miller,A] |
6091 | Propositions don't name facts, because each fact corresponds to a proposition and its negation [Russell] |
21702 | In 1918 still believes in nonlinguistic analogues of sentences, but he now calls them 'facts' [Russell, by Quine] |
6094 | An inventory of the world does not need to include propositions [Russell] |
6096 | I no longer believe in propositions, especially concerning falsehoods [Russell] |
21712 | I know longer believe in shadowy things like 'that today is Wednesday' when it is actually Tuesday [Russell] |
7315 | 'Jones is a married bachelor' does not have the logical form of a contradiction [Miller,A] |
6093 | The names in a logically perfect language would be private, and could not be shared [Russell] |
7328 | The principle of charity is holistic, saying we must hold most of someone's system of beliefs to be true [Miller,A] |
7329 | Maybe we should interpret speakers as intelligible, rather than speaking truth [Miller,A] |
7333 | The Frege-Geach problem is that I can discuss the wrongness of murder without disapproval [Miller,A] |
6119 | You can discuss 'God exists', so 'God' is a description, not a name [Russell] |