Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Tropes', 'The Analysis of Mind' and 'The Scope and Language of Science'

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13 ideas

6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
Maths can be reduced to logic and set theory [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
The category of objects incorporates the old distinction of substances and their modes [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
Individuals consist of 'compresent' tropes [Bacon,John]
A trope is a bit of a property or relation (not an exemplification or a quality) [Bacon,John]
Trope theory is ontologically parsimonious, with possibly only one-category [Bacon,John]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Maybe possible worlds are just sets of possible tropes [Bacon,John]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
In 1921 Russell abandoned sense-data, and the gap between sensation and object [Russell, by Grayling]
Seeing is not in itself knowledge, but is separate from what is seen, such as a patch of colour [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
We cannot assume that the subject actually exists, so we cannot distinguish sensations from sense-data [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
It is possible the world came into existence five minutes ago, complete with false memories [Russell]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
Knowledge needs more than a sensitive response; the response must also be appropriate [Russell]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
In perception, the self is just a logical fiction demanded by grammar [Russell]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 6. Conceptual Dualism
A hallucination can, like an ague, be identified with its host; the ontology is physical, the idiom mental [Quine]