Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Tropes', 'Regressive Method for Premises in Mathematics' and 'works'

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17 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
17641 Discoveries in mathematics can challenge philosophy, and offer it a new foundation [Russell]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
17638 If one proposition is deduced from another, they are more certain together than alone [Russell]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
17632 Non-contradiction was learned from instances, and then found to be indubitable [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
17640 Finding the axioms may be the only route to some new results [Russell]
17629 Which premises are ultimate varies with context [Russell]
17630 The sources of a proof are the reasons why we believe its conclusion [Russell]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 2. Proof in Mathematics
17627 It seems absurd to prove 2+2=4, where the conclusion is more certain than premises [Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
17628 Arithmetic was probably inferred from relationships between physical objects [Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
10464 A trope is a bit of a property or relation (not an exemplification or a quality) [Bacon,John]
10465 Trope theory is ontologically parsimonious, with possibly only one-category [Bacon,John]
10467 Individuals consist of 'compresent' tropes [Bacon,John]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
10466 Maybe possible worlds are just sets of possible tropes [Bacon,John]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
17637 The most obvious beliefs are not infallible, as other obvious beliefs may conflict [Russell]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
6587 It is always wrong to believe things on insufficient evidence [Clifford]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
17639 Believing a whole science is more than believing each of its propositions [Russell]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
17631 Induction is inferring premises from consequences [Russell]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
17633 The law of gravity has many consequences beyond its grounding observations [Russell]