Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Tropes', 'Elements of Set Theory' and 'Intro to 'Self-Representational Consciousness''

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

17 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / b. Terminology of ST
13201 ∈ says the whole set is in the other; ⊆ says the members of the subset are in the other [Enderton]
13204 The 'ordered pair' <x,y> is defined to be {{x}, {x,y}} [Enderton]
13206 A 'linear or total ordering' must be transitive and satisfy trichotomy [Enderton]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
13200 Note that {Φ} =/= Φ, because Φ ∈ {Φ} but Φ ∉ Φ [Enderton]
13199 The empty set may look pointless, but many sets can be constructed from it [Enderton]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / c. Unit (Singleton) Sets
13203 The singleton is defined using the pairing axiom (as {x,x}) [Enderton]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / h. Axiom of Replacement VII
13202 Fraenkel added Replacement, to give a theory of ordinal numbers [Enderton]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
13205 We can only define functions if Choice tells us which items are involved [Enderton]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
10467 Individuals consist of 'compresent' tropes [Bacon,John]
10464 A trope is a bit of a property or relation (not an exemplification or a quality) [Bacon,John]
10465 Trope theory is ontologically parsimonious, with possibly only one-category [Bacon,John]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
10466 Maybe possible worlds are just sets of possible tropes [Bacon,John]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
9312 Consciousness is reductively explained either by how it represents, or how it is represented [Kriegel/Williford]
9313 Experiences can be represented consciously or unconsciously, so representation won't explain consciousness [Kriegel/Williford]
9315 Red tomato experiences are conscious if the state represents the tomato and itself [Kriegel/Williford]
9316 How is self-representation possible, does it produce a regress, and is experience like that? [Kriegel/Williford]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
9314 Unfortunately, higher-order representations could involve error [Kriegel/Williford]