Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Presentism and Properties', 'Abstract of 'The Fourfold Root'' and 'Essence and Modality'

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28 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
11159 My account shows how the concept works, rather than giving an analysis [Fine,K]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
4187 'There is nothing without a reason why it should be rather than not be' (a generalisation of 'Why?') [Schopenhauer]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
11157 Modern philosophy has largely abandoned real definitions, apart from sortals [Fine,K]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
11171 Defining a term and giving the essence of an object don't just resemble - they are the same [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
11151 An object is dependent if its essence prevents it from existing without some other object [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
11152 Essences are either taken as real definitions, or as necessary properties [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
11161 Essentially having a property is naturally expressed as 'the property it must have to be what it is' [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
11160 Simple modal essentialism refers to necessary properties of an object [Fine,K]
11158 Essentialist claims can be formulated more clearly with quantified modal logic [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
11167 Metaphysical necessity is a special case of essence, not vice versa [Fine,K]
16537 Essence as necessary properties produces a profusion of essential properties [Fine,K, by Lowe]
11163 The nature of singleton Socrates has him as a member, but not vice versa [Fine,K]
11164 It is not part of the essence of Socrates that a huge array of necessary truths should hold [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
10935 An essential property of something must be bound up with what it is to be that thing [Fine,K, by Rami]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
10936 Essential properties are part of an object's 'definition' [Fine,K, by Rami]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
11165 If Socrates lacks necessary existence, then his nature cannot require his parents' existence [Fine,K]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
4192 All necessity arises from causation, which is conditioned; there is no absolute or unconditioned necessity [Schopenhauer]
11166 The subject of a proposition need not be the source of its necessity [Fine,K]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
11169 Conceptual necessities rest on the nature of all concepts [Fine,K]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
11162 Socrates is necessarily distinct from the Eiffel Tower, but that is not part of his essence [Fine,K]
11168 Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all objects [Fine,K]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
4190 All understanding is an immediate apprehension of the causal relation [Schopenhauer]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
4191 What we know in ourselves is not a knower but a will [Schopenhauer]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 3. Reference of 'I'
21368 The knot of the world is the use of 'I' to refer to both willing and knowing [Schopenhauer]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
11170 Analytic truth may only be true in virtue of the meanings of certain terms [Fine,K]
11172 The meaning of 'bachelor' is irrelevant to the meaning of 'unmarried man' [Fine,K]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
4189 Time may be defined as the possibility of mutually exclusive conditions of the same thing [Schopenhauer]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
14409 I am a presentist, and all language and common sense supports my view [Bigelow]