13 ideas
13169 | I call Aristotle's entelechies 'primitive forces', which originate activity [Leibniz] |
13168 | My formal unifying atoms are substantial forms, which are forces like appetites [Leibniz] |
13170 | The analysis of things leads to atoms of substance, which found both composition and action [Leibniz] |
13171 | Substance must necessarily involve progress and change [Leibniz] |
16678 | Without magnitude a thing would retain its parts, but they would have no location [Buridan] |
16793 | A thing is (less properly) the same over time if each part is succeeded by another [Buridan] |
16577 | Induction is not demonstration, because not all of the instances can be observed [Buridan] |
16576 | Science is based on induction, for general truths about fire, rhubarb and magnets [Buridan] |
20033 | Intentions are normative, requiring commitment and further plans [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall] |
20034 | Intentions must be mutually consistent, affirm appropriate means, and fit the agent's beliefs [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall] |
20026 | Intention is either the aim of an action, or a long-term constraint on what we can do [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall] |
20032 | Bratman rejected reducing intentions to belief-desire, because they motivate, and have their own standards [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall] |
13167 | We need the metaphysical notion of force to explain mechanics, and not just extended mass [Leibniz] |