11 ideas
| 6601 | Science rules the globe because of colonising power, not inherent rationality [Feyerabend] |
| 18823 | To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt] |
| 16678 | Without magnitude a thing would retain its parts, but they would have no location [Buridan] |
| 16793 | A thing is (less properly) the same over time if each part is succeeded by another [Buridan] |
| 16409 | Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker] |
| 16411 | If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker] |
| 16412 | If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker] |
| 16577 | Induction is not demonstration, because not all of the instances can be observed [Buridan] |
| 2561 | For Feyerabend the meaning of a term depends on a whole theory [Feyerabend, by Rorty] |
| 16576 | Science is based on induction, for general truths about fire, rhubarb and magnets [Buridan] |
| 16410 | Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker] |