36 ideas
| 19275 | You cannot understand what exists without understanding possibility and necessity [Hale] |
| 19291 | A canonical defintion specifies the type of thing, and what distinguish this specimen [Hale] |
| 19297 | The two Barcan principles are easily proved in fairly basic modal logic [Hale] |
| 19301 | With a negative free logic, we can dispense with the Barcan formulae [Hale] |
| 19296 | If second-order variables range over sets, those are just objects; properties and relations aren't sets [Hale] |
| 19289 | Maybe conventionalism applies to meaning, but not to the truth of propositions expressed [Hale] |
| 19298 | Unlike axiom proofs, natural deduction proofs needn't focus on logical truths and theorems [Hale] |
| 19295 | Add Hume's principle to logic, to get numbers; arithmetic truths rest on the nature of the numbers [Hale] |
| 19281 | Interesting supervenience must characterise the base quite differently from what supervenes on it [Hale] |
| 19278 | There is no gap between a fact that p, and it is true that p; so we only have the truth-condtions for p [Hale] |
| 16678 | Without magnitude a thing would retain its parts, but they would have no location [Buridan] |
| 19302 | If a chair could be made of slightly different material, that could lead to big changes [Hale] |
| 16793 | A thing is (less properly) the same over time if each part is succeeded by another [Buridan] |
| 19290 | Absolute necessities are necessarily necessary [Hale] |
| 19286 | 'Absolute necessity' is when there is no restriction on the things which necessitate p [Hale] |
| 19288 | Logical and metaphysical necessities differ in their vocabulary, and their underlying entities [Hale] |
| 19285 | Logical necessity is something which is true, no matter what else is the case [Hale] |
| 19287 | Maybe each type of logic has its own necessity, gradually becoming broader [Hale] |
| 19282 | It seems that we cannot show that modal facts depend on non-modal facts [Hale] |
| 19276 | The big challenge for essentialist views of modality is things having necessary existence [Hale] |
| 19293 | Essentialism doesn't explain necessity reductively; it explains all necessities in terms of a few basic natures [Hale] |
| 19294 | If necessity derives from essences, how do we explain the necessary existence of essences? [Hale] |
| 19279 | What are these worlds, that being true in all of them makes something necessary? [Hale] |
| 19299 | Possible worlds make every proposition true or false, which endorses classical logic [Hale] |
| 16577 | Induction is not demonstration, because not all of the instances can be observed [Buridan] |
| 16576 | Science is based on induction, for general truths about fire, rhubarb and magnets [Buridan] |
| 23438 | Full rationality must include morality [Foot] |
| 19300 | The molecules may explain the water, but they are not what 'water' means [Hale] |
| 23437 | Practical reason is goodness in choosing actions [Foot] |
| 23436 | It is an odd Humean view to think a reason to act must always involve caring [Foot] |
| 23431 | Human defects are just like plant or animal defects [Foot] |
| 23433 | Humans need courage like a plant needs roots [Foot] |
| 23432 | Concepts such as function, welfare, flourishing and interests only apply to living things [Foot] |
| 23434 | There is no fact-value gap in 'owls should see in the dark' [Foot] |
| 23439 | Principles are not ultimate, but arise from the necessities of human life [Foot] |
| 23435 | If you demonstrate the reason to act, there is no further question of 'why should I?' [Foot] |