Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Reason, Emotions and Good Life', 'works' and 'Value Theory'

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23 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
18680 To avoid misunderstandings supervenience is often expressed negatively: no A-change without B-change [Orsi]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
22167 Our images of bodies are not produced by the bodies, but by our own minds [Augustine, by Aquinas]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
22117 Our minds grasp reality by direct illumination (rather than abstraction from experience) [Augustine, by Matthews]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
22118 Augustine created the modern concept of the will [Augustine, by Matthews]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
4316 Either all action is rational, or reason dominates, or reason is only concerned with means [Cottingham]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
18684 Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
18666 Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi]
18667 The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi]
18685 Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi]
18679 Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi]
18682 A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi]
18683 Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi]
18686 The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
18672 Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
18677 A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
18668 Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi]
18670 The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi]
18669 Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
4348 Love, and do what you will [Augustine]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
7821 Pagans produced three hundred definitions of the highest good [Augustine, by Grayling]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
22119 Augustine said (unusually) that 'ought' does not imply 'can' [Augustine, by Matthews]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / d. Heresy
22116 Augustine identified Donatism, Pelagianism and Manicheism as the main heresies [Augustine, by Matthews]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / b. Human Evil
19338 Augustine said evil does not really exist, and evil is a limitation in goodness [Augustine, by Perkins]