17 ideas
18859 | Metaphysics is a quest for truthmakers [Tallant] |
18861 | Maybe number statements can be paraphrased into quantifications plus identities [Tallant] |
18866 | Maybe only 'positive' truths need truth-makers [Tallant] |
18860 | A truthmaker is the minimal portion of reality that will do the job [Tallant] |
18863 | What is the truthmaker for a possible new power? [Tallant] |
10631 | If 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, then 'heterological' is heterological if it isn't heterological [Hale/Wright] |
10624 | The incompletability of formal arithmetic reveals that logic also cannot be completely characterized [Hale/Wright] |
10629 | If structures are relative, this undermines truth-value and objectivity [Hale/Wright] |
10628 | The structural view of numbers doesn't fit their usage outside arithmetical contexts [Hale/Wright] |
10622 | The neo-Fregean is more optimistic than Frege about contextual definitions of numbers [Hale/Wright] |
18864 | The wisdom of Plato and of Socrates are not the same property [Tallant] |
10626 | Objects just are what singular terms refer to [Hale/Wright] |
18865 | Substance must have two properties: individuation, and property-bearing [Tallant] |
10630 | Abstracted objects are not mental creations, but depend on equivalence between given entities [Hale/Wright] |
18862 | Are propositions all the thoughts and sentences that are possible? [Tallant] |
10627 | Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions [Hale/Wright] |
4316 | Either all action is rational, or reason dominates, or reason is only concerned with means [Cottingham] |