Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Reason, Emotions and Good Life', 'Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself)' and 'Logic and Epistemology of Causal Relations'

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20 ideas

2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
Arguments are nearly always open to challenge, but they help to explain a position rather than force people to believe [Lewis]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
The whole truth supervenes on the physical truth [Lewis]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
Where pixels make up a picture, supervenience is reduction [Lewis]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
What is true used to be possible, but it may no longer be so [Wright,GHv]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / b. Purpose of mind
A mind is an organ of representation [Lewis]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Human pain might be one thing; Martian pain might be something else [Lewis]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
I am a reductionist about mind because I am an a priori reductionist about everything [Lewis]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
Folk psychology makes good predictions, by associating mental states with causal roles [Lewis]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
Folk psychology doesn't say that there is a language of thought [Lewis]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
If you don't share an external world with a brain-in-a-vat, then externalism says you don't share any beliefs [Lewis]
Nothing shows that all content is 'wide', or that wide content has logical priority [Lewis]
A spontaneous duplicate of you would have your brain states but no experience, so externalism would deny him any beliefs [Lewis]
Wide content derives from narrow content and relationships with external things [Lewis]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
Either all action is rational, or reason dominates, or reason is only concerned with means [Cottingham]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
p is a cause and q an effect (not vice versa) if manipulations of p change q [Wright,GHv]
We can imagine controlling floods by controlling rain, but not vice versa [Wright,GHv]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
The very notion of a cause depends on agency and action [Wright,GHv]
We give regularities a causal character by subjecting them to experiment [Wright,GHv]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
We must further analyse conditions for causation, into quantifiers or modal concepts [Wright,GHv]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 2. Types of Laws
Some laws are causal (Ohm's Law), but others are conceptual principles (conservation of energy) [Wright,GHv]