Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Reason, Emotions and Good Life', 'Beyond internal Foundations to external Virtues' and 'On Interpretation'

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30 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
8877 We can't attain a coherent system by lopping off any beliefs that won't fit [Sosa]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 4. Contraries
1708 In "Callias is just/not just/unjust", which of these are contraries? [Aristotle]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 10. Making Future Truths
1703 It is necessary that either a sea-fight occurs tomorrow or it doesn't, though neither option is in itself necessary [Aristotle]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
1704 Statements are true according to how things actually are [Aristotle]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic
22272 Aristotle's later logic had to treat 'Socrates' as 'everything that is Socrates' [Potter on Aristotle]
9405 Square of Opposition: not both true, or not both false; one-way implication; opposite truth-values [Aristotle]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
9728 Modal Square 1: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contraries' of □¬P and ¬◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
9729 Modal Square 2: ¬□¬P and ◊P are 'subcontraries' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
9730 Modal Square 3: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contradictories' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
9731 Modal Square 4: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'contradictories' of ¬□¬P and ◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
9732 Modal Square 5: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□¬P and ◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
9733 Modal Square 6: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
21593 In talking of future sea-fights, Aristotle rejects bivalence [Aristotle, by Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
1701 A prayer is a sentence which is neither true nor false [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
8884 The phenomenal concept of an eleven-dot pattern does not include the concept of eleven [Sosa]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
1706 Non-existent things aren't made to exist by thought, because their non-existence is part of the thought [Aristotle]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
1707 Maybe necessity and non-necessity are the first principles of ontology [Aristotle]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
8878 It is acceptable to say a supermarket door 'knows' someone is approaching [Sosa]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
8880 In reducing arithmetic to self-evident logic, logicism is in sympathy with rationalism [Sosa]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
8881 Most of our knowledge has insufficient sensory support [Sosa]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
8882 Perception may involve thin indexical concepts, or thicker perceptual concepts [Sosa]
8883 Do beliefs only become foundationally justified if we fully attend to features of our experience? [Sosa]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / d. Rational foundations
8885 Some features of a thought are known directly, but others must be inferred [Sosa]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations
8876 Much propositional knowledge cannot be formulated, as in recognising a face [Sosa]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
8879 Fully comprehensive beliefs may not be knowledge [Sosa]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
2337 For Aristotle meaning and reference are linked to concepts [Aristotle, by Putnam]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
13763 Spoken sounds vary between people, but are signs of affections of soul, which are the same for all [Aristotle]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
1705 It doesn't have to be the case that in opposed views one is true and the other false [Aristotle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
4316 Either all action is rational, or reason dominates, or reason is only concerned with means [Cottingham]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block
1702 Things may be necessary once they occur, but not be unconditionally necessary [Aristotle]