Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Reason, Emotions and Good Life', 'Review of Husserl's 'Phil of Arithmetic'' and 'Vagueness: a global approach'

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26 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
9821 A definition need not capture the sense of an expression - just get the reference right [Frege, by Dummett]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
9585 Since every definition is an equation, one cannot define equality itself [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
23548 Indeterminacy is in conflict with classical logic [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
23539 Classical semantics has referents for names, extensions for predicates, and T or F for sentences [Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / e. Counting by correlation
17446 Counting rests on one-one correspondence, of numerals to objects [Frege]
9582 Husserl rests sameness of number on one-one correlation, forgetting the correlation with numbers themselves [Frege]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
9586 In a number-statement, something is predicated of a concept [Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
9580 Our concepts recognise existing relations, they don't change them [Frege]
9589 Numbers are not real like the sea, but (crucially) they are still objective [Frege]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
9577 The naïve view of number is that it is like a heap of things, or maybe a property of a heap [Frege]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / b. Levels of abstraction
9578 If objects are just presentation, we get increasing abstraction by ignoring their properties [Frege]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / a. Problem of vagueness
23540 Conjoining two indefinites by related sentences seems to produce a contradiction [Fine,K]
23546 Standardly vagueness involves borderline cases, and a higher standpoint from which they can be seen [Fine,K]
23544 Local indeterminacy concerns a single object, and global indeterminacy covers a range [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
23542 Identifying vagueness with ignorance is the common mistake of confusing symptoms with cause [Fine,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
23541 Supervaluation can give no answer to 'who is the last bald man' [Fine,K]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
23545 We do not have an intelligible concept of a borderline case [Fine,K]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
23547 It seems absurd that there is no identity of any kind between two objects which involve survival [Fine,K]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
9581 Many people have the same thought, which is the component, not the private presentation [Frege]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
9579 Disregarding properties of two cats still leaves different objects, but what is now the difference? [Frege]
9587 How do you find the right level of inattention; you eliminate too many or too few characteristics [Frege]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
9588 Number-abstraction somehow makes things identical without changing them! [Frege]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
9583 Psychological logicians are concerned with sense of words, but mathematicians study the reference [Frege]
9584 Identity baffles psychologists, since A and B must be presented differently to identify them [Frege]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
4316 Either all action is rational, or reason dominates, or reason is only concerned with means [Cottingham]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
23543 We identify laws with regularities because we mistakenly identify causes with their symptoms [Fine,K]