55 ideas
15845 | It seems absurd that seeing a person's limbs, the one is many, and yet the many are one [Plato] |
1618 | We study bound variables not to know reality, but to know what reality language asserts [Quine] |
8455 | Canonical notation needs quantification, variables and predicates, but not names [Quine, by Orenstein] |
8456 | Quine extended Russell's defining away of definite descriptions, to also define away names [Quine, by Orenstein] |
1611 | Names can be converted to descriptions, and Russell showed how to eliminate those [Quine] |
9867 | It is absurd to define a circle, but not be able to recognise a real one [Plato] |
9865 | Daily arithmetic counts unequal things, but pure arithmetic equalises them [Plato] |
1613 | Logicists cheerfully accept reference to bound variables and all sorts of abstract entities [Quine] |
1616 | Formalism says maths is built of meaningless notations; these build into rules which have meaning [Quine] |
1615 | Intuitionism says classes are invented, and abstract entities are constructed from specified ingredients [Quine] |
1614 | Conceptualism holds that there are universals but they are mind-made [Quine] |
10241 | For Quine, there is only one way to exist [Quine, by Shapiro] |
4064 | The idea of a thing and the idea of existence are two sides of the same coin [Quine, by Crane] |
19277 | Quine rests existence on bound variables, because he thinks singular terms can be analysed away [Quine, by Hale] |
15857 | Any mixture which lacks measure and proportion doesn't even count as a mixture at all [Plato] |
14503 | If a mixture does not contain measure and proportion, it is corrupted and destroyed [Plato] |
12210 | Quine's ontology is wrong; his question is scientific, and his answer is partly philosophical [Fine,K on Quine] |
8496 | What actually exists does not, of course, depend on language [Quine] |
1610 | To be is to be the value of a variable, which amounts to being in the range of reference of a pronoun [Quine] |
8459 | Fictional quantification has no ontology, so we study ontology through scientific theories [Quine, by Orenstein] |
8497 | An ontology is like a scientific theory; we accept the simplest scheme that fits disorderly experiences [Quine] |
16261 | If commitment rests on first-order logic, we obviously lose the ontology concerning predication [Maudlin on Quine] |
7698 | If to be is to be the value of a variable, we must already know the values available [Jacquette on Quine] |
1612 | Realism, conceptualism and nominalism in medieval universals reappear in maths as logicism, intuitionism and formalism [Quine] |
4447 | If the good is one, is it unchanged when it is in particulars, and is it then separated from itself? [Plato] |
15402 | There is no entity called 'redness', and that some things are red is ultimate and irreducible [Quine] |
4443 | Quine has argued that predicates do not have any ontological commitment [Quine, by Armstrong] |
8498 | Treating scattered sensations as single objects simplifies our understanding of experience [Quine] |
15856 | A thing can become one or many, depending on how we talk about it [Plato] |
374 | If one object is divided into its parts, someone can then say that one are many and many is one [Plato] |
8856 | Quine's indispensability argument said arguments for abstracta were a posteriori [Quine, by Yablo] |
12443 | Can an unactualized possible have self-identity, and be distinct from other possibles? [Quine] |
389 | How can you be certain about aspects of the world if they aren't constant? [Plato] |
18209 | We can never translate our whole language of objects into phenomenalism [Quine] |
1619 | There is an attempt to give a verificationist account of meaning, without the error of reducing everything to sensations [Dennett on Quine] |
1617 | The word 'meaning' is only useful when talking about significance or about synonymy [Quine] |
1609 | I do not believe there is some abstract entity called a 'meaning' which we can 'have' [Quine] |
19159 | Quine relates predicates to their objects, by being 'true of' them [Quine, by Davidson] |
4316 | Either all action is rational, or reason dominates, or reason is only concerned with means [Cottingham] |
390 | If goodness involves moderation and proportion, then it seems to be found in beauty [Plato] |
392 | Neither intellect nor pleasure are the good, because they are not perfect and self-sufficient [Plato] |
391 | We could express the Good as beauty, proportion and truth combined [Plato] |
393 | Good first, then beauty, then reason, then knowledge, then pleasure [Plato, by PG] |
385 | Some of the pleasures and pains we feel are false [Plato] |
387 | A small pure pleasure is much finer than a large one contaminated with pain [Plato] |
371 | Reason, memory, truth and wisdom are far better than pleasure, for those who can attain them [Plato] |
373 | Pleasure is certainly very pleasant, but it doesn't follow that all pleasures are good [Plato] |
379 | The good must be sufficient and perfect, and neither intellect nor pleasure are that [Plato] |
382 | It is unlikely that the gods feel either pleasure or pain [Plato] |
376 | Would you prefer a life of pleasure without reason, or one of reason without pleasure? [Plato] |
381 | We feel pleasure when we approach our natural state of harmony [Plato] |
386 | Intense pleasure and pain are not felt in a good body, but in a worthless one [Plato] |
378 | A life of pure pleasure with no intellect is the life of a jellyfish [Plato] |
388 | Hedonists must say that someone in pain is bad, even if they are virtuous [Plato] |
377 | If you lived a life of maximum pleasure, would you still be lacking anything? [Plato] |