Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Middle Works (15 vols, ed Boydston)', 'Giordano Bruno and Hermetic Tradition' and 'The Moral Problem'

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28 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 4. Early European Thought
9288 The magic of Asclepius enters Renaissance thought mixed into Ficino's neo-platonism [Yates]
9291 The dating, in 1614, of the Hermetic writings as post-Christian is the end of the Renaissance [Yates]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
23728 Analysis aims to express the full set of platitudes surrounding a given concept [Smith,M]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
23744 Defining a set of things by paradigms doesn't pin them down enough [Smith,M]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 3. Value of Knowledge
22868 The value and truth of knowledge are measured by success in activity [Dewey]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 1. Self and Consciousness
22865 Habits constitute the self [Dewey]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
23743 Capturing all the common sense facts about rationality is almost impossible [Smith,M]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
23739 Goals need desires, and so only desires can motivate us [Smith,M]
23724 A pure desire could be criticised if it were based on a false belief [Smith,M]
23736 A person can have a desire without feeling it [Smith,M]
23723 In the Humean account, desires are not true/false, or subject to any rational criticism [Smith,M]
23735 Subjects may be fallible about the desires which explain their actions [Smith,M]
23738 Humeans (unlike their opponents) say that desires and judgements can separate [Smith,M]
23742 If first- and second-order desires conflict, harmony does not require the second-order to win [Smith,M]
23746 Objective reasons to act might be the systematic desires of a fully rational person [Smith,M]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
23733 Motivating reasons are psychological, while normative reasons are external [Smith,M]
23740 Humeans take maximising desire satisfaction as the normative reasons for actions [Smith,M]
23745 We cannot expect even fully rational people to converge on having the same desires for action [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / h. Against ethics
23731 'Externalists' say moral judgements are not reasons, and maybe not even motives [Smith,M]
23732 A person could make a moral judgement without being in any way motivated by it [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
23729 Moral internalism says a judgement of rightness is thereby motivating [Smith,M]
23730 'Rationalism' says the rightness of an action is a reason to perform it [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
23727 Expressivists count attitudes as 'moral' if they concern features of things, rather than their mere existence [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
23741 Is valuing something a matter of believing or a matter of desiring? [Smith,M]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
22871 The good people are those who improve; the bad are those who deteriorate [Dewey]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
22876 Democracy is the development of human nature when it shares in the running of communal activities [Dewey]
22875 Democracy is not just a form of government; it is a mode of shared living [Dewey]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
22874 Individuality is only developed within groups [Dewey]