Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Middle Works (15 vols, ed Boydston)', 'On Nature Itself (De Ipsa Natura)' and 'World and Essence'

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25 ideas

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
16435 Plantinga proposes necessary existent essences as surrogates for the nonexistent things [Plantinga, by Stalnaker]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
14655 The 'identity criteria' of a name are a group of essential and established facts [Plantinga]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
14658 'Being Socrates' and 'being identical with Socrates' characterise Socrates, so they are among his properties [Plantinga]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
12756 Substance is a force for acting and being acted upon [Leibniz]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14656 Does Socrates have essential properties, plus a unique essence (or 'haecceity') which entails them? [Plantinga]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
14654 Properties are 'trivially essential' if they are instantiated by every object in every possible world [Plantinga]
14653 X is essentially P if it is P in every world, or in every X-world, or in the actual world (and not ¬P elsewhere) [Plantinga]
14660 If a property is ever essential, can it only ever be an essential property? [Plantinga]
14661 Essences are instantiated, and are what entails a thing's properties and lack of properties [Plantinga]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
14657 Does 'being identical with Socrates' name a property? I can think of no objections to it [Plantinga]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
14652 'De re' modality is as clear as 'de dicto' modality, because they are logically equivalent [Plantinga]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
14659 We can imagine being beetles or alligators, so it is possible we might have such bodies [Plantinga]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 3. Value of Knowledge
22868 The value and truth of knowledge are measured by success in activity [Dewey]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / h. Explanations by function
12755 Final causes can help with explanations in physics [Leibniz]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 1. Self and Consciousness
22865 Habits constitute the self [Dewey]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
12760 Something rather like souls (though not intelligent) could be found everywhere [Leibniz]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
22871 The good people are those who improve; the bad are those who deteriorate [Dewey]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
22876 Democracy is the development of human nature when it shares in the running of communal activities [Dewey]
22875 Democracy is not just a form of government; it is a mode of shared living [Dewey]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
22874 Individuality is only developed within groups [Dewey]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
12759 There are atoms of substance, but no atoms of bulk or extension [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / a. Early Modern matter
12718 Secondary matter is active and complete; primary matter is passive and incomplete [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
11854 If there is some trace of God in things, that would explain their natural force [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
12758 It is plausible to think substances contain the same immanent force seen in our free will [Leibniz]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 2. Pantheism
19408 To say that nature or the one universal substance is God is a pernicious doctrine [Leibniz]