9 ideas
13856 | Conditionals are truth-functional, but we must take care with misleading ones [Grice, by Edgington] |
8948 | The odd truth table for material conditionals is explained by conversational conventions [Grice, by Fisher] |
13767 | Conditionals might remain truth-functional, despite inappropriate conversational remarks [Edgington on Grice] |
14277 | A person can be justified in believing a proposition, though it is unreasonable to actually say it [Grice, by Edgington] |
19722 | We could know the evidence for our belief without knowing why it is such evidence [Mittag] |
19723 | Evidentialism can't explain that we accept knowledge claims if the evidence is forgotten [Mittag] |
19720 | Evidentialism concerns the evidence for the proposition, not for someone to believe it [Mittag] |
19721 | Coherence theories struggle with the role of experience [Mittag] |
8478 | Dewey argued long before Wittgenstein that there could not seriously be a private language [Dewey, by Orenstein] |