57 ideas
22355 | In the realist view, the real external world explains how it (and perceptions of it) are possible [Williams,B] |
2730 | Because 'gold is malleable' is necessary does not mean that it is analytic [Audi,R] |
22868 | The value and truth of knowledge are measured by success in activity [Dewey] |
2715 | Beliefs are based on perception, memory, introspection or reason [Audi,R] |
2735 | Could you have a single belief on its own? [Audi,R] |
2736 | We can make certain of what we know, so knowing does not entail certainty [Audi,R] |
2722 | Sense-data theory is indirect realism, but phenomenalism is direct irrealism [Audi,R] |
2721 | If you gradually remove a book's sensory properties, what is left at the end? [Audi,R] |
2728 | The concepts needed for a priori thought may come from experience [Audi,R] |
2727 | Red and green being exclusive colours seems to be rationally graspable but not analytic [Audi,R] |
2716 | To see something as a field, I obviously need the concept of a field [Audi,R] |
2717 | How could I see a field and believe nothing regarding it? [Audi,R] |
2719 | Sense data imply representative realism, possibly only representing primary qualities [Audi,R] |
2720 | Sense-data (and the rival 'adverbial' theory) are to explain illusions and hallucinations [Audi,R] |
2718 | Perception is first simple, then objectual (with concepts) and then propositional [Audi,R] |
2741 | The principles of justification have to be a priori [Audi,R] |
2729 | Virtually all rationalists assert that we can have knowledge of synthetic a priori truths [Audi,R] |
2725 | To remember something is to know it [Audi,R] |
2724 | I might remember someone I can't recall or image, by recognising them on meeting [Audi,R] |
2731 | Justification is either unanchored (infinite or circular), or anchored (in knowledge or non-knowledge) [Audi,R] |
2739 | Internalism about justification implies that there is a right to believe something [Audi,R] |
2732 | Maths may be consistent with observations, but not coherent [Audi,R] |
2733 | It is very hard to show how much coherence is needed for justification [Audi,R] |
2734 | A consistent madman could have a very coherent belief system [Audi,R] |
2738 | Consistent accurate prediction looks like knowledge without justified belief [Audi,R] |
2740 | A reliability theory of knowledge seems to involve truth as correspondence [Audi,R] |
2737 | 'Reliable' is a very imprecise term, and may even mean 'justified' [Audi,R] |
4243 | Our ability to react to an alien culture shows that ethical thought extends beyond cultural boundaries [Williams,B] |
4244 | It is very confused to deduce a nonrelativist morality of universal toleration from relativism [Williams,B] |
22865 | Habits constitute the self [Dewey] |
2726 | We can be ignorant about ourselves, for example, our desires and motives [Audi,R] |
4114 | Philosophers try to produce ethical theories because they falsely assume that ethics can be simple [Williams,B] |
4128 | Intuitionism has been demolished by critics, and no longer looks interesting [Williams,B] |
4132 | The category of person is a weak basis for ethics, because it is not fixed but comes in degrees [Williams,B] |
4134 | The weakness of prescriptivism is shown by "I simply don't like staying at good hotels" [Williams,B] |
4135 | Some ethical ideas, such as 'treachery' and 'promise', seem to express a union of facts and values [Williams,B] |
4120 | It is an error of consequentialism to think we just aim at certain states of affairs; we also want to act [Williams,B] |
4252 | Promise keeping increases reliability, by making deliberation focus on something which would be overlooked [Williams,B] |
4116 | A weakness of contractual theories is the position of a person of superior ability and power [Williams,B] |
4112 | A crucial feature of moral thought is second-order desire - the desire to have certain desires [Williams,B] |
22871 | The good people are those who improve; the bad are those who deteriorate [Dewey] |
4113 | 'Deon' in Greek means what one must do; there was no word meaning 'duty' [Williams,B] |
4110 | Obligation and duty look backwards (because of a promise or job), although the acts are in the future [Williams,B] |
4249 | "Ought implies can" is a famous formula in connection with moral obligation [Williams,B] |
4248 | Not all moral deliberations lead to obligations; some merely reveal what 'may' be done [Williams,B] |
4250 | The concept of a 'duty to myself' is fraudulent [Williams,B] |
4121 | Why should I think of myself as both the legislator and the citizen who follows the laws? [Williams,B] |
4122 | If the self becomes completely impartial, it no longer has enough identity to worry about its interests [Williams,B] |
4124 | Utilitarian benevolence involves no particular attachments, and is immune to the inverse square law [Williams,B] |
4245 | Ethical conviction must be to some extent passive, and can't just depend on the will and decisions [Williams,B] |
4246 | Taking responsibility won't cure ethical uncertainty by; we are uncertain what to decide [Williams,B] |
22876 | Democracy is the development of human nature when it shares in the running of communal activities [Dewey] |
22875 | Democracy is not just a form of government; it is a mode of shared living [Dewey] |
22874 | Individuality is only developed within groups [Dewey] |
4247 | It is a mark of our having ethical values that we aim to reproduce them in our children [Williams,B] |
4131 | Most women see an early miscarriage and a late stillbirth as being very different in character [Williams,B] |
4133 | Speciesism isn't like racism, because the former implies a viewpoint which belongs to no one [Williams,B] |