44 ideas
1848 | We are coerced into assent to a truth by reason's violence [Aquinas] |
1858 | The mind is compelled by necessary truths, but not by contingent truths [Aquinas] |
1852 | For the mind Good is one truth among many, and Truth is one good among many [Aquinas] |
8166 | Truth is part of semantics, since valid inference preserves truth [Dummett] |
8173 | Language can violate bivalence because of non-referring terms or ill-defined predicates [Dummett] |
8179 | The law of excluded middle is the logical reflection of the principle of bivalence [Dummett] |
8184 | Philosophers should not presume reality, but only invoke it when language requires it [Dummett] |
8185 | We can't make sense of a world not apprehended by a mind [Dummett] |
8163 | Since 'no bird here' and 'no squirrel here' seem the same, we must talk of 'atomic' facts [Dummett] |
8161 | We know we can state facts, with true statements [Dummett] |
8180 | 'That is red or orange' might be considered true, even though 'that is red' and 'that is orange' were not [Dummett] |
22868 | The value and truth of knowledge are measured by success in activity [Dewey] |
1860 | Knowledge may be based on senses, but we needn't sense all our knowledge [Aquinas] |
8178 | Empirical and a priori knowledge are not distinct, but are extremes of a sliding scale [Dummett] |
22865 | Habits constitute the self [Dewey] |
1855 | If we saw something as totally and utterly good, we would be compelled to will it [Aquinas] |
1861 | The will is not compelled to move, even if pleasant things are set before it [Aquinas] |
1862 | However habituated you are, given time to ponder you can go against a habit [Aquinas] |
1853 | Because the will moves by examining alternatives, it doesn't compel itself to will [Aquinas] |
1856 | Nothing can be willed except what is good, but good is very varied, and so choices are unpredictable [Aquinas] |
1849 | Since will is a reasoning power, it can entertain opposites, so it is not compelled to embrace one of them [Aquinas] |
1854 | We must admit that when the will is not willing something, the first movement to will must come from outside the will [Aquinas] |
8174 | The theories of meaning and understanding are the only routes to an account of thought [Dummett] |
8175 | A theory of thought will include propositional attitudes as well as propositions [Dummett] |
8165 | To 'abstract from' is a logical process, as opposed to the old mental view [Dummett] |
8168 | To know the truth-conditions of a sentence, you must already know the meaning [Dummett] |
8181 | A justificationist theory of meaning leads to the rejection of classical logic [Dummett] |
8182 | Verificationism could be realist, if we imagined the verification by a superhuman power [Dummett] |
8183 | If truths about the past depend on memories and current evidence, the past will change [Dummett] |
8176 | We could only guess the meanings of 'true' and 'false' when sentences were used [Dummett] |
8170 | Sentences are the primary semantic units, because they can say something [Dummett] |
8169 | We can't distinguish a proposition from its content [Dummett] |
1857 | We don't have to will even perfect good, because we can choose not to think of it [Aquinas] |
1847 | The will must aim at happiness, but can choose the means [Aquinas] |
1846 | The will can only want what it thinks is good [Aquinas] |
1850 | Without free will not only is ethical action meaningless, but also planning, commanding, praising and blaming [Aquinas] |
1851 | Good applies to goals, just as truth applies to ideas in the mind [Aquinas] |
22871 | The good people are those who improve; the bad are those who deteriorate [Dewey] |
22876 | Democracy is the development of human nature when it shares in the running of communal activities [Dewey] |
22875 | Democracy is not just a form of government; it is a mode of shared living [Dewey] |
22874 | Individuality is only developed within groups [Dewey] |
1859 | Even a sufficient cause doesn't compel its effect, because interference could interrupt the process [Aquinas] |
8186 | Time is the measure of change, so we can't speak of time before all change [Dummett] |
8167 | If Presentism is correct, we cannot even say that the present changes [Dummett] |