140 ideas
11283 | There is pure deductive reasoning, and explanatory demonstration reasoning [Aristotle, by Politis] |
1672 | Maybe everything could be demonstrated, if demonstration can be reciprocal or circular [Aristotle] |
1684 | Two falsehoods can be contrary to one another [Aristotle] |
3426 | If one theory is reduced to another, we make fewer independent assumptions about the world [Kim] |
12145 | Definitions are of what something is, and that is universal [Aristotle] |
12384 | Definition by division needs predicates, which are well ordered and thorough [Aristotle] |
12075 | An Aristotelian definition is causal [Aristotle, by Witt] |
9066 | You can define objects by progressively identifying what is the same and what is different [Aristotle] |
12382 | What it is and why it is are the same; screening defines and explains an eclipse [Aristotle] |
1668 | An axiom is a principle which must be understood if one is to learn anything [Aristotle] |
12376 | Demonstrations by reductio assume excluded middle [Aristotle] |
12373 | Something holds universally when it is proved of an arbitrary and primitive case [Aristotle] |
12363 | Everything is either asserted or denied truly [Aristotle] |
13004 | Aristotle's axioms (unlike Euclid's) are assumptions awaiting proof [Aristotle, by Leibniz] |
12377 | Mathematics is concerned with forms, not with superficial properties [Aristotle] |
12372 | The essence of a triangle comes from the line, mentioned in any account of triangles [Aristotle] |
12369 | A unit is what is quantitatively indivisible [Aristotle] |
3431 | Supervenience suggest dependence without reduction (e.g. beauty) [Kim] |
3437 | 'Physical facts determine all the facts' is the physicalists' slogan [Kim] |
18910 | To seek truth, study the real connections between subjects and attributes [Aristotle] |
3430 | Resemblance or similarity is the core of our concept of a property [Kim] |
3432 | Is weight a 'resultant' property of water, but transparency an 'emergent' property? [Kim] |
3434 | Emergent properties are 'brute facts' (inexplicable), but still cause things [Kim] |
3436 | Should properties be individuated by their causal powers? [Kim] |
1675 | Separate Forms aren't needed for logic, but universals (one holding of many) are essential [Aristotle] |
1677 | We can forget the Forms, as they are irrelevant, and not needed in giving demonstrations [Aristotle] |
1687 | Why are being terrestrial and a biped combined in the definition of man, but being literate and musical aren't? [Aristotle] |
16776 | Substance is an intrinsic thing, so parts of substances can't also be intrinsic things [Duns Scotus] |
1681 | Units are positionless substances, and points are substances with position [Aristotle] |
12146 | Definitions recognise essences, so are not themselves essences [Aristotle] |
17039 | The predicates of a thing's nature are necessary to it [Aristotle] |
11994 | Aristotelian essences are properties mentioned at the starting point of a science [Aristotle, by Kung] |
12381 | What is necessary cannot be otherwise [Aristotle] |
1690 | A stone travels upwards by a forced necessity, and downwards by natural necessity [Aristotle] |
3406 | Counterfactuals are either based on laws, or on nearby possible worlds [Kim, by PG] |
12072 | For Aristotle knowledge is explanatory, involving understanding, and principles or causes [Aristotle, by Witt] |
12073 | 'Episteme' means grasping causes, universal judgments, explanation, and teaching [Aristotle, by Witt] |
12378 | The reason why is the key to knowledge [Aristotle] |
12364 | We understand a thing when we know its explanation and its necessity [Aristotle] |
12370 | Some understanding, of immediate items, is indemonstrable [Aristotle] |
12366 | We only understand something when we know its explanation [Aristotle] |
1685 | No one has mere belief about something if they think it HAS to be true [Aristotle] |
1673 | Knowledge proceeds from principles, so it is hard to know if we know [Aristotle] |
12379 | You cannot understand anything through perception [Aristotle] |
16725 | Some knowledge is lost if you lose a sense, and there is no way the knowledge can be replaced [Aristotle] |
1693 | Animals may have some knowledge if they retain perception, but understanding requires reasons to be given [Aristotle] |
23309 | Aristotle's concepts of understanding and explanation mean he is not a pure empiricist [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
9067 | Many memories of the same item form a single experience [Aristotle] |
1671 | Sceptics say justification is an infinite regress, or it stops at the unknowable [Aristotle] |
1670 | When you understand basics, you can't be persuaded to change your mind [Aristotle] |
12147 | The principles of demonstrations are definitions [Aristotle] |
12383 | There must be definitions before demonstration is possible [Aristotle] |
24068 | Demonstration is more than entailment, as the explanatory order must match the causal order [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
17310 | Aristotle gets asymmetric consequence from demonstration, which reflects real causal priority [Aristotle, by Koslicki] |
21359 | Aristotle doesn't actually apply his theory of demonstration to his practical science [Leroi on Aristotle] |
12365 | We can know by demonstration, which is a scientific deduction leading to understanding [Aristotle] |
1667 | Premises must be true, primitive and immediate, and prior to and explanatory of conclusions [Aristotle] |
10918 | Demonstrative understanding rests on necessary features of the thing in itself [Aristotle] |
12374 | Demonstrations must be necessary, and that depends on the middle term [Aristotle] |
12148 | Demonstrations are syllogisms which give explanations [Aristotle] |
1680 | Demonstration is better with fewer presuppositions, and it is quicker if these are familiar [Aristotle] |
1674 | All demonstration is concerned with existence, axioms and properties [Aristotle] |
1679 | Universal demonstrations are about thought; particular demonstrations lead to perceptions [Aristotle] |
1691 | Aim to get definitions of the primitive components, thus establishing the kind, and work towards the attributes [Aristotle] |
12371 | A demonstration is a deduction which proceeds from necessities [Aristotle] |
1683 | We learn universals from many particulars [Aristotle] |
12380 | Universals are valuable because they make the explanations plain [Aristotle] |
12385 | Are particulars explained more by universals, or by other particulars? [Aristotle] |
12367 | What is most universal is furthest away, and the particulars are nearest [Aristotle] |
1689 | Explanation is of the status of a thing, inferences to it, initiation of change, and purpose [Aristotle] |
1686 | What we seek and understand are facts, reasons, existence, and identity [Aristotle] |
12357 | Explanation and generality are inseparable [Aristotle, by Wedin] |
1669 | The foundation or source is stronger than the thing it causes [Aristotle] |
1678 | Universals give better explanations, because they are self-explanatory and primitive [Aristotle] |
3368 | Mind is basically qualities and intentionality, but how do they connect? [Kim] |
3392 | Mind is only interesting if it has causal powers [Kim] |
3396 | Experiment requires mental causation [Kim] |
3397 | Beliefs cause other beliefs [Kim] |
3367 | Both thought and language have intentionality [Kim] |
3365 | Intentionality involves both reference and content [Kim] |
3360 | Are pains pure qualia, or do they motivate? [Kim] |
3366 | Pain has no reference or content [Kim] |
3389 | Inverted qualia and zombies suggest experience isn't just functional [Kim] |
3391 | Crosswiring would show that pain and its function are separate [Kim, by PG] |
9068 | Perception creates primitive immediate principles by building a series of firm concepts [Aristotle] |
9069 | A perception lodging in the soul creates a primitive universal, which becomes generalised [Aristotle] |
3422 | Externalism about content makes introspection depend on external evidence [Kim] |
3412 | How do we distinguish our anger from embarrassment? [Kim] |
3363 | We often can't decide what emotion, or even sensation, we are experiencing [Kim] |
3409 | Mental substance causation makes physics incomplete [Kim] |
3399 | If epiphenomenalism were true, we couldn't report consciousness [Kim] |
3390 | Are inverted or absent qualia coherent ideas? [Kim] |
3414 | What could demonstrate that zombies and inversion are impossible? [Kim] |
3359 | Cartesian dualism fails because it can't explain mental causation [Kim] |
3369 | Logical behaviourism translates mental language to behavioural [Kim] |
3428 | Behaviourism reduces mind to behaviour via bridging principles [Kim] |
3380 | Are dispositions real, or just a type of explanation? [Kim] |
3370 | What behaviour goes with mathematical beliefs? [Kim] |
3371 | Behaviour depends on lots of mental states together [Kim] |
3372 | Behaviour is determined by society as well as mental states [Kim] |
3373 | Snakes have different pain behaviour from us [Kim] |
3379 | Neurons seem to be very similar and interchangeable [Kim] |
3388 | Machine functionalism requires a Turing machine, causal-theoretical version doesn't [Kim] |
3384 | The person couldn't run Searle's Chinese Room without understanding Chinese [Kim] |
3393 | How do functional states give rise to mental causation? [Kim] |
3439 | Reductionism gets stuck with qualia [Kim] |
3427 | Reductionism is impossible if there aren't any 'bridge laws' between mental and physical [Kim] |
3376 | We can't assess evidence about mind without acknowledging phenomenal properties [Kim] |
3424 | Most modern physicalists are non-reductive property dualists [Kim] |
3362 | Supervenience says all souls are identical, being physically indiscernible [Kim] |
3413 | Zombies and inversion suggest non-reducible supervenience [Kim] |
3374 | Token physicalism isn't reductive; it just says all mental events have some physical properties [Kim] |
3433 | The core of the puzzle is the bridge laws between mind and brain [Kim] |
3377 | Elimination can either be by translation or by causal explanation [Kim] |
3438 | Reductionists deny new causal powers at the higher level [Kim] |
3440 | Without reductionism, mental causation is baffling [Kim] |
3375 | If an orange image is a brain state, are some parts of the brain orange? [Kim] |
3411 | How do we distinguish our attitudes from one another? [Kim] |
3387 | A culture without our folk psychology would be quite baffling [Kim] |
3386 | Folk psychology has been remarkably durable [Kim] |
3410 | Folk psychology has adapted to Freudianism [Kim] |
3394 | Maybe folk psychology is a simulation, not a theory [Kim] |
3382 | A machine with a mind might still fail the Turing Test [Kim] |
3383 | The Turing Test is too specifically human in its requirements [Kim] |
3408 | Two identical brain states could have different contents in different worlds [Kim] |
3420 | Two types of water are irrelevant to accounts of behaviour [Kim] |
3418 | 'Arthritis in my thigh' requires a social context for its content to be meaningful [Kim] |
3416 | Content may match several things in the environment [Kim] |
3421 | Content is best thought of as truth conditions [Kim] |
3417 | Content depends on other content as well as the facts [Kim] |
3419 | Pain, our own existence, and negative existentials, are not external [Kim] |
9070 | We learn primitives and universals by induction from perceptions [Aristotle] |
12368 | Negation takes something away from something [Aristotle] |
3403 | We assume people believe the obvious logical consequences of their known beliefs [Kim] |
3402 | If someone says "I do and don't like x", we don't assume a contradiction [Kim] |
1692 | If you shouldn't argue in metaphors, then you shouldn't try to define them either [Aristotle] |
12375 | Whatever holds of a kind intrinsically holds of it necessarily [Aristotle] |
3401 | A common view is that causal connections must be instances of a law [Kim] |
3407 | Laws are either 'strict', or they involve a 'ceteris paribus' clause [Kim] |
1688 | Properties must be proved, but not essence; but existents are not a kind, so existence isn't part of essence [Aristotle] |