59 ideas
| 6928 | Only that which can be an object of religion is an object of philosophy [Feuerbach] |
| 6918 | Philosophy should not focus on names, but on the determined nature of things [Feuerbach] |
| 6904 | Modern philosophy begins with Descartes' abstraction from sensation and matter [Feuerbach] |
| 6931 | Empiricism is right about ideas, but forgets man himself as one of our objects [Feuerbach] |
| 6933 | The laws of reality are also the laws of thought [Feuerbach] |
| 19023 | Slippery slope arguments are challenges to show where a non-arbitrary boundary lies [Vetter] |
| 19033 | Deontic modalities are 'ought-to-be', for sentences, and 'ought-to-do' for predicates [Vetter] |
| 19032 | S5 is undesirable, as it prevents necessities from having contingent grounds [Vetter] |
| 19036 | The Barcan formula endorses either merely possible things, or makes the unactualised impossible [Vetter] |
| 19034 | The world is either a whole made of its parts, or a container which contains its parts [Vetter] |
| 6919 | Absolute thought remains in another world from being [Feuerbach] |
| 19457 | Being is what is undetermined, and hence indistinguishable [Feuerbach] |
| 6920 | Being posits essence, and my essence is my being [Feuerbach] |
| 6921 | Particularity belongs to being, whereas generality belongs to thought [Feuerbach] |
| 6926 | The only true being is of the senses, perception, feeling and love [Feuerbach] |
| 19015 | Grounding can be between objects ('relational'), or between sentences ('operational') [Vetter] |
| 19012 | The Humean supervenience base entirely excludes modality [Vetter] |
| 19024 | A determinate property must be a unique instance of the determinable class [Vetter] |
| 19021 | I have an 'iterated ability' to learn the violin - that is, the ability to acquire that ability [Vetter] |
| 19016 | We should think of dispositions as 'to do' something, not as 'to do something, if ....' [Vetter] |
| 19017 | Nomological dispositions (unlike ordinary ones) have to be continually realised [Vetter] |
| 19014 | How can spatiotemporal relations be understood in dispositional terms? [Vetter] |
| 16776 | Substance is an intrinsic thing, so parts of substances can't also be intrinsic things [Duns Scotus] |
| 19030 | Why does origin matter more than development; why are some features of origin more important? [Vetter] |
| 19040 | We take origin to be necessary because we see possibilities as branches from actuality [Vetter] |
| 19008 | The modern revival of necessity and possibility treated them as special cases of quantification [Vetter] |
| 19029 | It is necessary that p means that nothing has the potentiality for not-p [Vetter] |
| 19028 | Possibilities are potentialities of actual things, but abstracted from their location [Vetter] |
| 19010 | All possibility is anchored in the potentiality of individual objects [Vetter] |
| 19013 | Possibility is a generalised abstraction from the potentiality of its bearer [Vetter] |
| 19019 | Potentiality is the common genus of dispositions, abilities, and similar properties [Vetter] |
| 19022 | Water has a potentiality to acquire a potentiality to break (by freezing) [Vetter] |
| 23705 | A potentiality may not be a disposition, but dispositions are strong potentialities [Vetter, by Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
| 19009 | Potentiality does the explaining in metaphysics; we don't explain it away or reduce it [Vetter] |
| 19027 | Potentiality logic is modal system T. Stronger systems collapse iterations, and necessitate potentials [Vetter] |
| 19025 | Potentialities may be too weak to count as 'dispositions' [Vetter] |
| 19031 | There are potentialities 'to ...', but possibilities are 'that ....'. [Vetter] |
| 19011 | If worlds are sets of propositions, how do we know which propositions are genuinely possible? [Vetter] |
| 19037 | Are there possible objects which nothing has ever had the potentiality to produce? [Vetter] |
| 6908 | Consciousness is absolute reality, and everything exists through consciousness [Feuerbach] |
| 6932 | Ideas arise through communication, and reason is reached through community [Feuerbach] |
| 6935 | In man the lowest senses of smell and taste elevate themselves to intellectual acts [Feuerbach] |
| 19018 | Explanations by disposition are more stable and reliable than those be external circumstances [Vetter] |
| 19020 | Grounding is a kind of explanation, suited to metaphysics [Vetter] |
| 6925 | The new philosophy thinks of the concrete in a concrete (not a abstract) manner [Feuerbach] |
| 6924 | Plotinus was ashamed to have a body [Feuerbach] |
| 6927 | If you love nothing, it doesn't matter whether something exists or not [Feuerbach] |
| 6934 | Man is not a particular being, like animals, but a universal being [Feuerbach] |
| 6936 | The essence of man is in community, but with distinct individuals [Feuerbach] |
| 19039 | The view that laws are grounded in substance plus external necessity doesn't suit dispositionalism [Vetter] |
| 19038 | Dispositional essentialism allows laws to be different, but only if the supporting properties differ [Vetter] |
| 19026 | If time is symmetrical between past and future, why do they look so different? [Vetter] |
| 19041 | Presentists explain cross-temporal relations using surrogate descriptions [Vetter] |
| 6913 | God's existence cannot be separated from essence and concept, which can only be thought as existing [Feuerbach] |
| 6903 | If God is only an object for man, then only the essence of man is revealed in God [Feuerbach] |
| 6923 | God is what man would like to be [Feuerbach] |
| 6911 | God is for us a mere empty idea, which we fill with our own ego and essence [Feuerbach] |
| 6902 | Catholicism concerns God in himself, Protestantism what God is for man [Feuerbach] |
| 6905 | Absolute idealism is the realized divine mind of Leibnizian theism [Feuerbach] |