21 ideas
17311 | Real definitions don't just single out a thing; they must also explain its essence [Koslicki] |
17312 | It is more explanatory if you show how a number is constructed from basic entities and relations [Koslicki] |
6402 | In 1927, Russell analysed force and matter in terms of events [Russell, by Grayling] |
17314 | The relata of grounding are propositions or facts, but for dependence it is objects and their features [Koslicki] |
16648 | Accidents must have formal being, if they are principles of real action, and of mental action and thought [Duns Scotus] |
15386 | If only the singular exists, science is impossible, as that relies on true generalities [Duns Scotus, by Panaccio] |
15387 | If things were singular they would only differ numerically, but horse and tulip differ more than that [Duns Scotus, by Panaccio] |
14732 | A perceived physical object is events grouped around a centre [Russell] |
16632 | We distinguish one thing from another by contradiction, because this is, and that is not [Duns Scotus] |
13094 | The haecceity is the featureless thing which gives ultimate individuality to a substance [Duns Scotus, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
16770 | It is absurd that there is no difference between a genuinely unified thing, and a mere aggregate [Duns Scotus] |
14733 | An object produces the same percepts with or without a substance, so that is irrelevant to science [Russell] |
10919 | What prevents a stone from being divided into parts which are still the stone? [Duns Scotus] |
17313 | Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times [Koslicki] |
17309 | For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions [Koslicki] |
17315 | We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions [Koslicki] |
16768 | Two things are different if something is true of one and not of the other [Duns Scotus] |
6418 | Russell rejected phenomenalism because it couldn't account for causal relations [Russell, by Grayling] |
17317 | A good explanation captures the real-world dependence among the phenomena [Koslicki] |
17316 | We can abstract to a dependent entity by blocking out features of its bearer [Koslicki] |
21706 | At first matter is basic and known by sense-data; later Russell says matter is constructed [Russell, by Linsky,B] |