27 ideas
| 3695 | Philosophy is a priori if it is anything [Bonjour] |
| 3651 | Perceiving necessary connections is the essence of reasoning [Bonjour] |
| 3700 | Coherence can't be validated by appeal to coherence [Bonjour] |
| 16405 | To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient? [Stalnaker] |
| 16776 | Substance is an intrinsic thing, so parts of substances can't also be intrinsic things [Duns Scotus] |
| 16407 | Possible worlds allow separating all the properties, without hitting a bare particular [Stalnaker] |
| 3697 | The concept of possibility is prior to that of necessity [Bonjour] |
| 16397 | If it might be true, it might be true in particular ways, and possible worlds describe such ways [Stalnaker] |
| 16399 | Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains [Stalnaker] |
| 16398 | Possible worlds allow discussion of modality without controversial modal auxiliaries [Stalnaker] |
| 16396 | Kripke's possible worlds are methodological, not metaphysical [Stalnaker] |
| 16408 | Rigid designation seems to presuppose that differing worlds contain the same individuals [Stalnaker] |
| 3707 | Our rules of thought can only be judged by pure rational insight [Bonjour] |
| 3704 | Moderate rationalists believe in fallible a priori justification [Bonjour] |
| 3706 | A priori justification can vary in degree [Bonjour] |
| 3696 | A priori justification requires understanding but no experience [Bonjour] |
| 3703 | You can't explain away a priori justification as analyticity, and you can't totally give it up [Bonjour] |
| 3699 | The induction problem blocks any attempted proof of physical statements [Bonjour] |
| 3701 | Externalist theories of justification don't require believers to have reasons for their beliefs [Bonjour] |
| 3702 | Externalism means we have no reason to believe, which is strong scepticism [Bonjour] |
| 3709 | Induction must go beyond the evidence, in order to explain why the evidence occurred [Bonjour] |
| 3708 | All thought represents either properties or indexicals [Bonjour] |
| 16406 | If you don't know what you say you can't mean it; what people say usually fits what they mean [Stalnaker] |
| 16404 | In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent [Stalnaker] |
| 16403 | 'Descriptive' semantics gives a system for a language; 'foundational' semantics give underlying facts [Stalnaker] |
| 16401 | To understand an utterance, you must understand what the world would be like if it is true [Stalnaker] |
| 3698 | Indeterminacy of translation is actually indeterminacy of meaning and belief [Bonjour] |